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ABSTRACT
This article reviews important recent developments in the
interpretation and application of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). Specifically, the article reviews three important rulings
from the federal courts of appeals, Sierra Club v. United States
Fish and Wildlife Service, Arizona Cattle Growers v.
United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and New Mexico
Cattle Growers v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
When read together, these cases reveal an emergingjudicial trend
toward limiting the federal government's discretion under the
ESA.
Further,these decisions have placed the federal government in the
impossible position of implementing mandatory species programs
without the required funding. Thus, the article announces,
species conservation policy is being determined by activists and
judges rather than by scientists. The article describes the holdings
of the three cases and discusses the severity of the constraints they
place on ESA implementation and enforcement. It also offers
several suggestions for reform and evaluates each potential
solution's chances for success. The articlefurther contends that
none of the solutions is likely to succeed and that the modern
trend of setting species policy through litigation is likely to
continue.
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In the early 1970s, Congress enacted a significant number of new
environmental laws, marking the dawn of "the environmental revolution."1 The Clean Air Act, 2 the Clean Water Act, 3 the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),4 and the "pit bull" of environmental
laws, 5 the Endangered Species Act (ESA or Act),6 marked a new age in
federal authority over the environment. Through legislative
amendments, regulations, and court decisions, agency control over
environmental regulation expanded greatly through the 1980s and into
the mid-1990s. 7 Recently, however, federal courts of appeals have been
taking a harder look at federal administrative authority, especially
8
discretionary actions.
After 20 years of expanding authority in federal agencies, 9 courts
are making evident an emerging distaste for unrestricted discretion in
the federal agencies charged with administering environmental laws.
Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the limits placed on the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and its implementation of the
ESA. 10 Recently, federal courts have limited the amount of discretion
enjoyed by FWS in three significant opinions. The Fifth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have each published opinions
narrowing FWS's ability to pick and choose whether and how to enforce
1. Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 395,
396 (1995).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7403, et seq. (2000).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq. (2000).
5. J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act and Private Property: A Matter of Timing and
Location, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37 (1998).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq. (2000).
7. See generally Stanley H. Anderson, The Evolution and Use of the Endangered Species
Act, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 487 (1997).
8. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers [hereinafter SWANCC], 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (invalidating the Army Corps'
expansive interpretation of its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. Though the statute
was unclear, the Court interpreted federal jurisdiction narrowly to avoid raising questions
about Congress's Commerce Clause authority.). But see Todd William Roles, Has the
Supreme Court Armed Property Owners in Their Fight Against Environmentalists? Bennett v.
Spear and Its Effect on Environmental Litigation, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 227, 241 (1999) (arguing that
the court will continue to be deferential to agency decisions due to the lax standard of
review). Roles' article was written in 1999, but SWANCC and the three trend-setting
decisions covered in Part I of this article were issued in 2000 and 2001.
9. See Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.
Departments of Interiorand Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 278, 279 (1993).
10. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is also responsible for
implementing those portions of the Act that relate to aquatic species. See generally 16 U.S.C.
§ 1361, et seq. (2000). For purposes of this article, any reference to FWS also includes NMFS
where relevant.
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the ESA's provisions." These rulings strictly limit the agency's discretion
to that conferred by statute and require the agency to implement
mandatory provisions. These cases are important not only for the way in
which they will restrict agency authority and alter agency practice, but
also for the developing trend that they signal. Federal courts are no
longer willing to allow the FWS to ignore portions of the ESA, execute
them improperly, or operate with unfettered discretion.
Part I of this article provides an outline of the relevant portions
of the ESA and briefly explains them. Part II discusses Arizona Cattle
Growers Association v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service and its impact
on agency authority and discretion. Part III examines Sierra Club v.
United States Fish and Wildlife Service and New Mexico Cattle Growers
Association v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service and how these
decisions impact FWS and the regulated communities. Part IV discusses
other FWS activities that may be struck down in the near future, while
part V offers possible solutions and discusses the viability of each option.
1. BACKGROUND: A GUIDE TO THE ESA
Understanding the implications of the recent decisions by the
courts of appeals requires a working knowledge of the ESA. This article
will focus on three essential sections of the Act. Section 912 covers the
various activities prohibited by the Act, including when "taking" a listed
species will result in liability. Section 413 sets out the process by which
species are listed, requires that land be designated as critical habitat, and
establishes the procedures for doing so. Section 714 details the
requirements that government agencies must meet when their actions
affect a listed species or its critical habitat. The following is a brief history
of the ESA and a description of each section.
A. The ESA: A Brief History's
Dissatisfied with previous efforts to make headway in the fight
to protect endangered species and their habitats, Congress adopted the
ESA in 1973 to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
11. Ariz. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir.
2001); Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001); N.M. Cattle
Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1533 (2000).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
15. This section provides only a cursory overview of the major legislative developments in the Act's history. For a more thorough discussion, see Houck, supra note 9.
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endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved
[and] provide a program for the conservation of such endangered
species and threatened species." 16 Congress found that a large number of
species had become "so depleted in numbers that they [we]re in danger
of... extinction," due to the pressures of agriculture, population growth,
and urban sprawl, and that others had become "extinct as a consequence
of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern
and conservation." 17 Prior laws had only protected endangered species
on federal land and prohibited importing enumerated species; 18 the 1973
Act applied to species on all land in the United States, whether public or
private. 19 This was a significant leap for species protection and was
heralded as "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of
endangered species ever enacted by any nation." 20
This tough new law permitted both governments and private
citizens to enforce its provisions. 21 Both enthusiastically enforced the Act
and its lofty goals until the Tellico Dam controversy. 22 At Tellico, the
presence of an endangered fish, the Snail darter, halted completion of a
dam on the Little Tennessee River, despite the fact that the government
had already spent more than one hundred million dollars on the
project.23 After a contentious legal battle, the Supreme Court held that
the ESA "admits of no exception" and that "endangered species [are] to
be afforded the highest of priorities." 24 Despite the massive amount of
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2000).
18. See Davina Kari Kaile, Evolution of Wildlife Legislation in the United States: An
Analysis of the Legal Efforts to Protect Endangered Species and the Prospects for the Future, 5 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 448 (1993) (providing an outline of the Act as it existed in both 1966
and 1969). Technically, the 1966 and 1969 acts also required federal agencies to protect
endangered species insofar as it was practicable, but that mandate was largely ignored. See
83 Stat. 275 (1969) and 80 Stat. 926 (1966). Finally, the 1973 Act extended limited protections
to plants. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(14) (2000).
19. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2000). The ESA also applies to listed species on
the territorial and high seas. Id.
20. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978), superseded by statute at
16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(2) (2000).
21. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000). The citizen-suit provision permits any person
(subject to the Eleventh Amendment and presumably within the limits of constitutional
standing requirements) to bring a suit to enjoin any person in violation of the Act or to
compel the FWS to perform any nondiscretionary act. See id.
22. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law
Paradigmand Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 805, 806 (1986). See also William J. Snape
II & Robert M. Ferris, Saving America's Wildlife: Renewing the Endangered Species Act, at
http://www.defenders.org/pubs/save05.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
23. See Plater, supra note 22, at 813 n.31 (noting that 95 percent of the money for the
dam construction had already been spent).
24. Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. at 173-74.

Winter 20041

ESA ENFORCEMENT

tax dollars that would go to waste, the Supreme Court enjoined the
government from beginning the operation of the dam after concluding
that the Snail darter would be jeopardized by the completion of the
dam.

25

Not surprisingly, Congress responded to the Tellico Dam
controversy with a series of amendments designed to avoid such a
conflict in the future. 26 Rather than weakening the substantive provisions
of the Act, the1978 amendments defined several terms 27 and added the
much debated but seldom used "God Squad" provision, a procedural
device to exempt agencies from the Act and avoid another Tellico
situation. 28 Congress also added requirements for local hearings 29 and
required FWS to designate critical habitat concurrently with the listing of
species.

30

Congress added another round of significant amendments in
198231 aimed at streamlining the Act, including various technical
amendments and two more exemption procedures. 32 Since then, the Act

25. Id.at 195.
26. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 1, 92 Stat.
3751 (1978). See also Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 951804 (1978), codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq. (2000). But see Houck, supra note 9, at 283
(arguing that these amendments, rather than affording flexibility, "ground the listing
process to a halt").
27. Terms defined were "critical habitat," "Federal Agency," "State agency," "species,"
"irresolvable conflict," "permit or license applicant," and "alternative courses of action."
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92
Stat.) 3751, 3751-52.
28. The "God Squad" is the common name given to the Endangered Species
Committee. See The Thoreau Institute, The History of the Endangered Species Act, at http://
www.ti.org/ESAHistory.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004). The God Squad is made up of the
administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, the chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, a state
representative, and the secretaries of the Army, Agriculture, and Interior. See 16 U.S.C. §
1536(e)(3) (2000). It is rarely used and has been described as "impossibly difficult." John C.
Kunich, Species & Habitat Conservation: The Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation Under the
EndangeredSpecies Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 501, 560 (1994).
29. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 1, 92 Stat.
3765 (1978).
30. See id. at 3764, 3766. In these amendments, Congress also required the secretary to
consider economic impacts when designating critical habitat. This significant provision is
discussed in Part III.B.
31. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 1417, 1426.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 14 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2814-15.
One exemption provision applies to private parties while the other applies to federal
agencies. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1), 1536(b)(4) (2000).
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33
has gone largely unmodified and has not been reauthorized. The
following sections briefly describe the relevant provisions of the Act.

B. Section 9: The ESA Prohibitions
Section 9 prohibits any person or government agency from
34
taking a member of an endangered species without authorization.
"Take" is defined as any action that will "harass [or] harm" a member of
an endangered species or any attempt to "pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
35
kill, trap, capture, or collect" a member of the species. The terms listed
in the definition of "take" are not themselves defined but most are selfexplanatory. The precise meaning of "harm," however, has been the
subject of much litigation.36 According to FWS regulations, "harm" is "an
act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or
injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
37
including breeding, feeding or sheltering." Thus, section 9 prohibits
both direct and indirect forms of harming members of a listed species.
The penalties for violating section 9 range from imprisonment to civil
38
penalties including fines and permit revocation.

33. In its 1988 reauthorization, Congress only extended the ESA through 1992. Thus,
the Act required reauthorization in 1992 but technically "expired" when no agreement
could be reached. See M. Neil Browne & Nancy K. Kubasek, A Communitarian Green Space
Between Market and Political Rhetoric About Environmental Law, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 127, 164
(1999). The ESA's provisions still operate even though the Act technically "expired,"
because a federal statute usually remains in effect, despite the expiration of its
authorization, absent an express sunset provision. See Donald J. Barry, The Endangered
Species Act: Amending the Endangered Species Act, the Ransom of Red Chief and Other Related
Topics, 21 ENVTL. L. 587, 597 (1991).
The only essential question is whether the government continues to
possess adequate "budget authority" to spend federal funds on behalf of
the expired program. Conveniently, annual appropriations acts are
deemed adequate for providing this requisite "budget authority." Thus, as
long as funds are appropriated, an environmental statute remains in
business. This explains why numerous environmental laws like the Clean
Air Act and the Clean Water Act have had their authorizations lapse
without any real world consequences
Id.
34. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2000).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(19) (2000).
36. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687
(1995); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir.
2000).
37. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
38. These penalties are actually set out in section 11. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2000).
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C. Section 4: Listing and Critical Habitat Designation
Section 4 imposes a duty on the FWS to list endangered and
threatened species and to designate critical habitat for those species. 39
The FWS may list a species when it is "in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 40 A species is
threatened if it is "likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future." 41 The authority of the FWS to list extends to all
42
species of plants and animals, except pest insects.
When listing a species, FWS must, "to the maximum extent
prudent, designate habitat critical to the survival of the species at the
time of listing." 43 Once lands are designated as critical habitat, they are
subject to a variety of restrictions. 44 Critical habitat may consist of both
public and private lands and may be either occupied or unoccupied by
45
the species.
To be eligible for designation as critical habitat, occupied lands
must be "the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the
species.. .on which are found those physical or biological features (I)
essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require
special management considerations or protection." 46 Unoccupied habitat
may be designated only if it is determined "by the Secretary that such
areas are essential for the conservation of the species." 47 The Act defines
conservation as the "use of all methods and procedures which are
necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the
point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer
necessary." 48 This language is generally understood to mean recovery. 49

39. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2000).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (2000).
42. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000). See also Nancye L. Bethurem, Environmental
Destruction in the Name of National Security: Will the Old Paradigm Return in the Wake of
September 11?, 8 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 109, 113 n.16 (2002).
43. H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 14 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2810.
44. See The Application of the Endangered Species Act to the Protection of Freshwater
Mussels: A Case Study, 32 ENVTL. L. 91, 146 n.279 (2002) (citing Edward C. Beedy, Ten Ways
to Fix the Endangered Species Act, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 12-14
(arguing that critical habitat designation has the potential to "restrict land uses and to
reduce property values" on private property, and is costly to designate).
45. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(5)(A) (2000).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i) (2000).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2000).
49. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002) (defining recovery as "improvement in the status of
listed species to the point at which listing is no longer appropriate" under the statute).
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Thus, unoccupied critical habitat is that which FWS determines to be
5°
essential to the survival or recovery of the species.
In designating critical habitat, FWS must use "the best scientific
and commercial data available" and must conduct an individualized
economic impact analysis to assess the financial repercussions of the
designate land if the financial
designation. 51 The FWS may choose not to
52
burdens outweigh the ecological benefits.
D. Section 7: Interagency Consultation
Section 7, commonly referred to as the heart of the ESA, is the
Act's most used provision. 53 Under section 7, federal agencies must
consult with FWS to insure that any action that they authorize, fund, or
carry out neither jeopardizes the continued existence of an endangered
or threatened species nor results in the destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat.54 Agency actions that require section 7
consultation typically involve contracting for services (e.g., building
roads) and permitting; the private parties are involved during the
55
consultation stage.
Once consultation begins, FWS is responsible for issuing a
biological opinion. 56 The biological opinion must state whether the action
will jeopardize the continued existence of the species or adversely

50. "Essential" means "of the utmost importance." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 396 (10th ed. 1996). "Essential" is not the same as "useful" or "beneficial,"
which mean "capable of being put to use." Id. Only land that is truly essential may be
designated as critical habitat.
51. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000). See also PAMELA BALDWIN, THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: CONSIDERATION OF ECONOMIC FACTORS (Cong. Res. Serv., Rep. No. RL30792,
Jan. 5, 2001).
52. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000).
53. See generally Jeffrey S. Kopf, Steamrolling Section 7(d) of the Endangered Species Act:
How Sunk Costs UndermineEnvironmental Regulation, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 393 (1996).
54. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). The terms "authorize," "fund," and "carry out"
collectively make up "agency action." Agency action is regulated by section 7(a)(2).
Unfortunately, neither the terms "authorize," "fund," "carry out," nor "agency action" is
defined in the Act. Courts have determined whether something is agency action on an ad
hoc basis as industry groups and environmentalists bring court challenges to mark the
boundaries of the term. For more thorough treatment of this issue, see Derick A. Weller,
Limiting the Scope of the Endangered Species Act: Discretionary Federal Involvement or Control
Under Section 402.03, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 309 (1999). For the moment,
the scope of the term remains unclear and may or may not include activity as minor as a
federally insured home loan.
55. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A (2000).
56. Id.
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modify critical habitat.57 If so, FWS must offer "reasonable and prudent
alternatives." 58 While other agencies are technically free to ignore
biological opinions, these opinions have a "virtually determinative
effect" on the consulting agencies, which almost always adopt any
59
conditions or mitigation suggestions.
Even if FWS determines that "no jeopardy" will result from the
agency action, the consultation process is not necessarily over. If the
action will not jeopardize the species under section 7 but will result in
the "take" of a species under section 9, the agency and any permit
applicant may apply for an incidental take statement (ITS) from FWS.60
An ITS shields the federal agency and the permitee from the normal
section 9 liability that would result from a take. As discussed in part II,
the issuance of an ITS allows the agency or its permitee to engage in a
take if they accept certain other conditions. 61 The FWS must still ensure
that the underlying agency action does not jeopardize the species or
adversely modify critical habitat and must guarantee that the take itself
will not place the species in jeopardy. 62
The ITS, however, comes with a price for the applicant because
FWS must still specify (1) the impact of the taking on the species, (2) the
reasonable and prudent measures the secretary deems necessary or
57. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3) (2000). See also Jeremy Firestone & Robert Barber, Fish as
Pollutants: Limitations of and Crosscurrentsin Law, Science, Management, and Policy, 78 WASH.
L. REV. 693, 736 n.251 (2003).
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2000). Reasonable and prudent alternatives are
actions identified during formal consultation that can be implemented in a
manner consistent with the intended purpose of the action, that can be
implemented consistent with the scope of the Federal agency's legal
authority and jurisdiction, that is economically and technologically
feasible, and.. would avoid the likelihood of jeopardizing the continued
existence of listed species or resulting in the destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002).
59. Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997).
60. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2000). Some commentators have suggested that FWS
must issue an ITS in every biological opinion regardless of whether a take will occur. See
Robert S. Nix, Bennett v. Spear: Justice Scalia Oversees the Latest "Battle" in the "War" Between
Property Rights and Environmentalism, 70 TEMPLE L. REV. 745, 753 (1997) (arguing that FWS
must issue an ITS if it concludes that no threat to the species or adverse modification would
result from the project). But cf. J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act:
Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species,
25 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1119-20 (1995) (suggesting that an ITS is appropriate only if the
biological opinion concludes that a take will occur). Courts have rejected the mandatory
ITS interpretation in favor of Professor Ruhl's view. This will be discussed at length in Part
II infra.
61. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2000).
62. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(B) (2000).
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appropriate to minimize the impact, and (3) the terms and conditions
with which the consulting agency must comply to implement the
measures to minimize impact.63 Conditions may range from providing
64
funds for recovery projects to providing land for species habitat. The
costs of complying with conditions in ITSs are65almost universally borne
by private parties applying for federal permits.
II. ARIZONA CATTLE GROWERS: A MAJOR SETBACK FOR
AGENCY DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY
In early 2001, the Ninth Circuit issued a strongly worded
opinion in Arizona Cattle Growers that removed a large measure of FWS's
66
discretion in imposing conditions in ITSs. The opinion resulted from
two separate but related district court cases in which ranchers challenged
FWS's policy of imposing vague conditions in areas where species were
unlikely to be harmed. 67 In the first, the Arizona Cattle Growers'
Association (ACGA) and Jeff Menges challenged conditions in an ITS
6
issued by the FWS in a biological opinion for certain grazing lands. 8
Menges, a rancher, sought a grazing permit under a Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) program affecting more than one and one-half69
million acres of grazing allotments in the Tucson area. The FWS's
biological opinion, issued in late 1997, covered 20 species and concluded
that the program was unlikely to either jeopardize the continued
existence of the species or result in adverse modification of critical

63. In practice, the process of obtaining an ITS is simple but costly. Once a federal
agency determines that its project will affect an endangered or threatened species and
engages in consultation with FWS, the FWS may determine that there will be a take but no
jeopardy. The FWS then issues an ITS stating the terms deemed necessary or appropriate
for minimizing the impact. Lastly, the consulting agency agrees to the terms and imposes
them on the permit applicant as conditions of the permit.
64. See Christopher H.M. Carter, A Dual Track for Incidental Takings: Reexamining
Sections 7 and 10 of the Endangered Species Act, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 135, 167 (1991).
65. Id. at 162.
66. See Ariz. CattleGrowers, 273 F.3d 1229.
67. See Ariz. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (D.
Ariz. 1998) [hereinafter ACGA f]; Ariz. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
No. CIV 99-0673 PHX RCB, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23236 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 1999) [hereinafter
ACGA II].
68. See ACGA 1,63 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
69. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1233. Grazing cattle on public land is a common
practice in the Southwest. Rather than sell otherwise non-developable land or leave it
fallow, the government permits private persons to graze cattle on it in exchange for a fee.
See 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2000).
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habitat. 70 The FWS found, however, that an incidental take of some of the
species would occur and issued several ITSs. 71 As a condition of issuing a
permit for the take, FWS ordered ranchers to refrain from grazing in
certain areas and to pay for monitoring in the area. 72
ACGA's suit challenged both the issuance of the ITSs and the
attached conditions. 73 The plaintiffs argued that FWS had improperly
issued the ITSs without providing evidence that a take would occur and
objected to the permit conditions as vague or unsupported by the
evidence. 74 ACGA focused particularly on the incidental take statements
for the Razorback sucker and the Cactus ferruginous pygmy-owl. 75 The
district court agreed with Menges and the Cattle Growers, holding that
FWS's issuance of ITSs for the Razorback sucker and the pygmy-owl was
arbitrary and capricious because the service "failed to provide sufficient
reason to believe that listed species exist in the allotments in question." 76

70. ACGA 1, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1036. Grazing allotments are federal lands upon which
private individuals are permitted to graze livestock. Large portions of public land in the
western states are grazed. The BLM administers grazing allotments on 163.3 million acres,
and the Forest Service administers grazing allotments on 89.6 million acres. Kristi Johnson,
The Mythical Giant: Clean Water Act Section 401 and Nonpoint Source Pollution, 29 ENVTL. L.
417, 440 (1999).
71. ACGA 1, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1036; See Programmatic Biological Opinion for the
Safford and Tucson Field Offices' Livestock Grazing Program, Southeastern Arizona, at ht
tp://arizonaes.fws.gov/Documents/BiologicalOpinions/96160%2Programmatic%20BO%
20Safford-Tucson%20Livestock%2OGrazing%20SE%2OArizona.pdf [hereinafter Safford &
Tucson Biological Opinion] (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
72. See ACGA I, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
No grazing of cattle shall occur on Bureau-administered lands in the 100year flood plain of the Gila River, and the riparian corridors of Bonita
Creek and the San Francisco River through the project area for the life of
the project (through December 31, 2006). Actions shall be taken, including
fencing, monitoring for and removal of trespass cattle, and other measures
to ensure grazing does not occur on these lands
Id. (quoting Safford & Tucson Biological Opinion, supra note 71).
73. Id. at 1037.
74. Id. The association sought to force FWS to name a specific number of endangered
species that must be taken for the permit to be violated, rather than simply conditioning the
permit based on environmental factors. The ACGA argued that the environmental factors
condition gave FWS boundless discretion to determine whether a take had occurred and
further claimed that the permit conditions were illegal because they failed to identify a
numerical amount of authorized take. Id.
75. The FWS issues a separate ITS for each species. See Safford & Tucson Biological
Opinion, supra note 71.
76. ACGA I, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. The court did not reach the conditions of the ITSs
because it held that the ITSs should never have been issued.
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In a second suit, ACGA challenged ITSs issued by FWS for
77
livestock grazing on U.S. Forest Service lands. There, FWS determined
that the ongoing grazing activities would incidentally take members of
78
one or more protected species in each of the 22 allotments. ACGA
contested the ITSs for six of the allotments. After examining the
biological opinion, the district court determined that FWS acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing an ITS for five of the allotments
because the biological opinion failed to show that a take was reasonably
certain to occur. 79
The FWS appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the trial
court erred on several points of law. First, FWS argued that the text of
section 7 required it to issue an ITS regardless of whether there would be
a take. 80 Second, the service claimed that the court applied an overly
narrow definition of the term "take" in section 7.81 The FWS argued that
"take" had a broader meaning in section 7 than in section 9 and,
therefore, it could issue an ITS based on any possibility that a species
could be taken rather than by the "reasonable certainty" standard
82
announced by the lower court. Regarding the vagueness of the permit
conditions, FWS argued that it had full authority to establish thresholds
for permitted takes based on general environmental conditions.
Although FWS argued that the text of section 7 required an ITS
83
in every biological opinion regardless of whether a take would occur,
"only when a take has
the lower courts held that an ITS was allowed
4
occur."8
to
certain
reasonably
occurred or is

77. ACGA I, No. CIV 99-0673 PHX RCB, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23236. Jeff Menges did
not take part in this litigation.
78. ACGA II, No. CIV 99-0673 PHX RCB, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23236, at *5-*6. "A
grazing allotment is '[a] designated area of land available for livestock grazing upon which
a specified number and kind of livestock may be grazed under a range allotment
management plan.'" Peter Morrisette, Is There Room for Free-Roaming Bison in Greater
Yellowstone?, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 467, 477 n.42 (2000) (quoting Forest Service, Dep't of Agric.,
Gallatin Nat'l Forest Plan VI-28 (1987)).
79. ACGA II, No. CIV 99-0673 PHX RCB, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23236, at *51-*52. The
district court upheld the final ITS because FWS showed that a take was reasonably certain
to occur. Id. at *52.
80. Ariz. CattleGrowers, 273 F.3d at 1241.
81. Id. at 1240-41.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1241.
84. See ACGA II, No. CIV 99-0673 P-X RCB, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23236, at *37 (citing
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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A. Key Holdings
1. FWS May Not Issue an ITS in Every Biological Opinion
On appeal, FWS challenged the district court's ruling and
asserted that Chevron deference should be applied to sustain the
Agency's interpretation of its statutory responsibilities. 85 FWS
maintained that the statutory language spoke clearly and supported its
position and that ITSs were mandatory in every biological opinion.86
While the Ninth Circuit agreed that the statute did require FWS to issue
ITSs, it found that certain conditions must be met before an ITS was
appropriate. 87 The section, read in context, states:
If after consultation under subsection (a)(2), the Secretary
concludes that (A) the agency action will not violate such subsection...;
(B) the taking of an endangered or a threatened species
incidental to the agency action will not violate such
subsection; and
(C) if...
a marine mammal is involved, the taking is
authorized pursuant to section 101(a)(5) of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 [16 U.S.C. §§ 1361 et seq.]
the secretary shall provide the Federal agency.. .with [an
ITS.]88
In response to FWS's narrow, non-contextual reading, the court invoked
the Whole Act Rule 89 of statutory construction requiring "that the words
of a statute.. .be read.. .with a view to their place in the overall statutory
85. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1236-37. According to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), an agency interpretation of a statute
should be granted deference if (1) the statute is ambiguous and (2) the agency
interpretation is reasonable. See also John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretationsof Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996); see also
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE

MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) (arguing that courts should treat statutory law, like the common law, as a "rational
and purposive construct. Thus, they should resolve ambiguities by 'assuming, unless the
contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable goals reasonably."').
86. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1241.
87. Id.
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2000).
89. Under the Whole Act Rule, a court must interpret a statute as a "symmetrical and
coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole." FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (citations omitted).
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scheme." 90 Reading the subsection as a whole, the Ninth Circuit
disagreed with FWS's interpretation and held that the FWS may issue an
91
ITS only pursuant to the conditions outlined in section 7(b)(4).
The court found that both FWS's implementing regulations and
the legislative history of the Act supported this interpretation. The FWS's
own implementing regulations stated that FWS must "formulate a
92
statement concerning incidental take, if such take may occur," indicating
that even agency policy did not require an ITS in every biological
opinion.93 Further, the legislative history of the ITS procedure suggested
that it was intended only to provide a safe harbor from section 9
liability. 94 Thus, the panel reasoned that "it would be nonsensical, to
require the issuance of [an ITS] when no takings cognizable under
Section 9 are to occur." 95 Highlighting the intent of the Act, the common
sense interpretation of its terms, the legislative history, and the agency's
own regulations, the court determined "that the plain language of the
ESA does not dictate that the Fish and Wildlife Service must issue an
Incidental Take Statement irrespective of whether any incidental takings
will occur." 96
2. FWS Must Not Issue an ITS Without Evidence That a Take Is Reasonably
Certain to Occur
To counter the claim that no protected species were present in
the regulated areas, FWS asserted that the term "take" in section 7 had a
broader meaning than the same term in section 9.97 Though section 2
defines "take" for purposes of the entire act, FWS argued that the term
should be understood in light of the differing purposes of section 7 and
section 9. The FWS maintained that section 9 should be read restrictively
to include only incidences of actual takings, because it was enacted to
98
punish people who violated the Act. Section 7, they argued, ordered

90. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273, F.3d at 1241 (citing Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489
U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).
91. Id. The required findings are quoted in the text above. Essentially, they require
FWS to conclude that the underlying agency action will not violate section 7(a)(2), the
taking will be incidental to the underlying action, and the incidental take will not cause
jeopardy. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2000).
7
92. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)( ) (2002) (emphasis added).
93. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1242.
94. See H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 26 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2826.
95. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1242.
96. Id. at 1241.
97. Id. at 1234.
98. Id. at 1237. That is, according to FWS, section 9 operates as a negative
reinforcement, stopping action.
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federal agencies to protect species, so "take" in that context should be
read broadly to include any possibility that a species could be harmed. 99
FWS further asserted that its interpretation of section 7 take, outlined in
FWS's internal section 7 consultation handbook, should be given
controlling weight under Chevron.100
The Ninth Circuit also rejected FWS's interpretation that take
had a broader definition in section 7 than in section 9.101 First, the court
held that Chevron only requires deference if Congress has not spoken to
the precise question at issue. 0 2 Here, however, the panel concluded that
Congress had spoken, as evidenced by the language and structure of the
Act. 10 3 The panel found that "the Incidental Take Statement provided in
Section 7 functions as a safe harbor provision immunizing persons from
Section 9 liability." 1°4 After all, the ITS provision existed only to shield
the agency from liability for a take; 05 otherwise, the agency action could
not proceed as long as an endangered species would be harmed. 10 6
If there is no section 9 liability, the court reasoned, there is no
need for a section 7 incidental take statement and no justification for
placing restrictive conditions on an otherwise legal action.107 Without the
specter of section 9 liability, there is no need for a safe harbor. In fact, the
"clear intent" behind the amendments adding this procedure was to
ensure that any take occurring within the terms of an ITS was not
considered a violation of section 9.108 ESA section 7(o)(2) expressly
provides that such take "shall not be considered to be a taking of the

99. Id. In other words, FWS argued that section 7 gives federal agencies an affirmative
duty to protect species, rather than simply ordering agencies to refrain from harming
species (as in section 9). FWS argued that "take" could be read differently because section 9
was prohibitory and section 7 was proactive.
100. Id. at 1242. An agency is generally accorded deference in interpreting the statutes
that the agency is charged with enforcing. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 191 (2001).
101. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1240 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 853, n.9 (1984)).
102. Id. at 1236-37.
103. Id. at 1237-39.
104. Id. at 1239. See also Weller, supra note 54, at 334.
105. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(7)(o)(2) (2002).
106. Michael C. Blumm & Jonathan Lovvorn, The ProposedTransfer of BLM Timber Lands
to the State of Oregon: Environmentaland Economic Questions, 32 LAND & WATER L. REv. 353,
395 n.230 (1997). Remember that harm does not necessarily mean death or even physical
injury. See generally Part 1.B supra.
107. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1242.
108. James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup Look
from a Litigator'sPerspective, 21 ENvTL. L. 499, 555 (1991).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

species concerned." 10 9 Thus, a broader interpretation of section 7 was
unwarranted.
The panel again noted that the legislative history of the Act
weighed against FWS's expansive interpretation of a section 7 take. 110
The court found that, in enacting the 1982 amendments, Congress meant
to introduce flexibility into section 7 by providing a way for projects to
continue when they did not violate the jeopardy provisions of section 7
but did violate the taking provisions of section 9.111 A broad
interpretation of section 7, the court observed, "would allow the Fish and
Wildlife Service to engage in widespread land regulation even where no
Section 9 liability could be imposed," 112 and "would turn the purpose
behind the 1982 Amendment on its head." 113 Looking to the legislative
history of the 1982 amendment, the court found that
[t]he "purpose of Section 7 (b)(4) (incidental take
permits).. .is to resolve the situation in which a Federal
agency or a permit or license applicant has been advised
that the proposed action will not violate section 7(a)(2) of
the Act but the proposed action will result in the taking of
some species incidental to the action -a clear violation of
Section 9."114
Thus, the 1982 amendments were intended only to provide an exception
to section 9's ironclad prohibition against take. The court then expressly
held that, absent rare circumstances, it is arbitrary and capricious to issue
an ITS when there is not a reasonable certainty that a take will occur
incident to otherwise lawful activity. 115
Having lost the arguments that an ITS must be issued in every
biological opinion and that an ITS was warranted by any possibility of a
take, FWS argued that the district court set an inappropriately high bar
in ruling that FWS had to prove a take was "reasonably certain" before
an ITS was authorized. 116 The Ninth Circuit again disagreed, explaining
109. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2) (2000). See also H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 26 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2087, 2826.
110. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d. at 1239-40. The legislative history is fairly explicit on
this point. See H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2831
("Section 10(a), as amended, would allow the Secretary to permit any taking otherwise
prohibited by Section 9(a)(1)(B)....") (emphasis added).
111. See H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 8 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807.
112. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1240.
113. Id.
114. See H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 26 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2826.
115. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1242.
116. Id. at 1235. The court noted that FWS "strenuously objects" to the reasonable
certainty standard. Id.

Winter 2004]

ESA ENFORCEMENT

that ACGA II "held merely that if the Fish and Wildlife Service cannot
satisfy the court to a reasonable certainty that a take will occur, then it is
arbitrary and capricious for it to issue an Incidental Take Statement
imposing conditions on the use of land."1 7 The court stopped short of
requiring FWS to provide evidence that an actual take had already
occurred but held that the agency must find that a take is reasonably
certain to occur before it issues an ITS." 8 Thus, FWS may not issue an ITS
with permit conditions unless it concludes that a section 9 take is likely.
3. Adverse Modification of Unoccupied HabitatDoes Not Justify an ITS
Having announced that take must be reasonably certain to occur
before an ITS is appropriate, the Ninth Circuit examined each of FWS's
actions to determine whether the agency's decisions were based on a
"consideration of relevant factors" and whether there was a "clear error
of judgment" under the arbitrary and capricious standard." 9 The court
concluded that FWS failed to support its findings of harm to the species
and that the conditions it imposed were illegal after conducting a
species-by-species analysis to determine if a take was likely and
reviewing the conditions imposed in the ITSs to discover if there was "a
120
rational connection between the facts found and the choices made."
The FWS argued that members of the Razorback sucker species
were likely to be taken even though the species could not be shown to
exist in the regulated area.' 2 ' The FWS pointed to the prospective nature
of ITSs and argued that, though no fish had been observed since 1991, it
was likely that small numbers of the fish survived in the area. 122
Additionally, the FWS argued that the fish could repopulate the area in
the future and be taken due to grazing activities.123 Further, the FWS
added that a take of the Razorback sucker could result from adverse
modification of critical habitat. 24
The Ninth Circuit flatly rejected FWS's arguments that future
harm could come to the fish or that permit conditions could be
supported by the theoretical presence of fish. First, the court disagreed
117. Id. at 1243.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1236.
120. Id. at 1243 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs.' Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ass'n, 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d
1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990)).
121. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1243.
122. ITSs are long-term documents lasting for substantial periods of time, upwards of
90 years.
123. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1243-44.
124. Id. at 1244.
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with FWS's argument that small numbers of fish were present in the
area, finding it totally lacking in evidentiary support. 25 "This speculative
evidence without more," the court stated, "is woefully insufficient to
meet the standards imposed by the governing statute." 126 Since FWS did
not have any other evidence to support its assertion that the species was
present in the area, there could be no take based on present harm to the
species.
Second, the court noted that, rather than issuing an ITS, the
agency should reinitiate consultation if the species repopulated the
area, 127 because using the ITS procedure to account for speculative future
takes would make the reinitiation procedure obsolete and would upset
the structure of the Act.1 28 Thus, the Ninth Circuit prohibited FWS from
inserting conditions into a permit based on the theory that a member of
an endangered species could be harmed if it occupied the land in the
129
future.
The panel also rejected FWS's argument that it could protect
potential habitat and found that Congress intended the critical habitat
provisions of section 4 to be the exclusive method for protecting
unoccupied habitat. 130 Allowing FWS to regulate unoccupied potential
habitat through the section 7 consultation process would obviate the
need for critical habitat protections and "allow the Fish and Wildlife
Service to regulate any parcel of land that is merely capable of
supporting a protected species." 131 The court rejected FWS's argument
that a take could result from habitat modification in this case. "Although
habitat modification resulting in actual killing may constitute a taking,"
they noted, "the Fish and Wildlife Service has presented only speculative
evidence that habitat modification... may impact the razorback

125. Id.
126. Id. at 1245.
127. Reinitiation of consultation is provided for in 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (1986). If an action
over which the agency has continuing authority affects a listed species, which was not
previously affected by the agency action, the agency must engage in a new consultation to
ensure that the species is not jeopardized or taken. Id.
128. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1244.
129. Id.
130. Id. Recall that section 4 provides for the designation of critical habitat. See Part I.C
supra. Of course, designation of critical habitat does not provide instant protection. The real
protection comes during inter-agency consultation when FWS determines that a federal
agency's action may damage that habitat. In that case, FWS must provide reasonable and
prudent alternatives that will not cause adverse modification of critical habitat. See 16
U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2000). See also Robert J. Glennon & Peter W. Culp, The Last Green
Lagoon: How and Why the Bush Administration Should Save the Colorado River Delta, 28
ECOLOGY L.Q. 903, 961 (2002).
131. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1244.
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sucker." 132 Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected FWS's argument that the
burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the species was not present in
the area. 133 The court found both that the ESA required FWS, not the
plaintiffs, to show that the species was present and that, in any event, it
would be difficult and unfair to require permitees to prove that species
were not present. 134 Rather, the court concluded that FWS had the
135
statutory duty to support its findings.
Having rejected FWS's factual findings, the court determined
that the agency failed to provide sufficient evidentiary support for its
contention that the Razorback sucker would be taken. 136 Placing a
significant limit on FWS's discretion, the court held that, "[w]here the
agency purports to impose conditions on the lawful use of land without
showing that the species exists on it, it acts beyond its authority in
137
violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706."
4. FWS Must State the Maximum Take Allowed by the ITS in an Objectively
MeasurableManner
When issuing an ITS, FWS must indicate how much taking is
permitted. 138 If the permitee exceeds the authorized level of take, the
permit may be revoked and the takes are subject to the Act's full
penalties. 139 Since it is difficult for the agency to monitor the level of take
and even more difficult to determine whether an individual member of
an endangered species has been killed or harmed, 140 FWS frequently
states that the authorized level of take will be deemed to be exceeded if
environmental conditions do not improve. 141 The court indicated its
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. ("[Ilt would be improper to force ACGA to prove that the species does not exist
on the permitted area... both because it would require ACGA to meet the burden statutorily
imposed on the agency, and because it would be requiring it to prove a negative.").
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000).
139. See Weller, supra note 54, at 334.
140. Imagine the difficulty in determining whether reproductive patterns or feeding
habits of a small and widely dispersed species have been altered. FWS simply does not
have the resources to monitor these kinds of developments in a realistic fashion. See
Thomas F. Darin, Designating Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: Habitat
Protection Versus Agency Discretion, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 231 (2000) (acknowledging
FWS's "extremely limited resources").
141. Indeed, that is what FWS did here. See Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1250. Rather
than meaningfully defining the "ecological conditions," FWS noted vaguely that improving
conditions can be defined through improvements in watershed, soil condition, trend and
condition of rangelands (e.g., vegetative litter, plant vigor, and native species diversity),
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displeasure with the fact that this is a routine practice rather than an
exception or last resort measure. 142 The court stopped short, however, of
banning the use of ecological conditions as a standard for determining
when a permitted take has been exceeded. While noting that a numerical
value is preferred, the court found that Congress "anticipated situations
in which impact could not be contemplated in terms of a precise
number." 143 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit was careful to limit the
agency's discretion in this area as well, holding that, before another
standard may be used, "the Fish and Wildlife Service must establish that
no such numerical value could be practically obtained." 144 The court held
that it was permissible for FWS to use ecological conditions as a
substitute so long as they were associated with take of the species.145
Applying the standard to FWS's actions here, the court of appeals found
that the conditions the agency issued in this case were so vague as to be
meaningless. 46 Worse, this put the permitee at the mercy of FWS, giving
the agency "unfettered discretion" over whether the conditions had been
violated. 47 The panel disapproved of this lack of objectivity and the fact
that the conditions left the permitees with the responsibility for the
general ecology of over 22,000 acres and invalidated the conditions. 48 By
prohibiting FWS from using vague standards such as environmental
degradation, which leaves the applicant with no way to know when or
whether a permit has been violated, the court again limited the
discretion available to FWS in issuing permitting conditions.

riparian conditions (e.g., vegetative and geomorphologic: bank, terrace, and flood plain
conditions), and stream channel conditions (e.g., channel profile, embeddedness, water
temperature, and base flow) within the natural capabilities of the landscape in all pastures
on the allotment within the Blue River watershed. Id. at 1249.
142. Id. at 1250-51.
143. Id. at 1250. See also H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2807, 2827 ("[Tihe Committee does not intend that the Secretary will, in every instance,
interpret the word impact to be a precise number. Where possible, the impact should be
specified in terms of a numerical limitation.").
144. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1250. FWS regulations indicate no preference for
numbers or ecological indicators. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2002) (defining impact as "the
amount or extent of such incidental taking on the species").
145. See Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1250 ("[T]he use of ecological conditions as a
surrogate for defining the amount or extent of incidental take is reasonable so long as these
conditions are linked to the take of the protected species.").
146. Id. at 1250 ("This vague analysis, however, cannot be what Congress contemplated
when it anticipated that surrogate indices might be used in place of specific numbers.").
147. Id. ("Moreover, whether there has been compliance with this vague directive is
within the unfettered discretion of the Fish and Wildlife Service, leaving no method by
which the applicant or the action agency can gauge their performance.").
148. Id. at 1250-51.
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While the ACGA opinion does not invalidate all uses of
ecologically based conditions, it does require FWS to show that
numerical values are not available before it may use ecological
conditions as a proxy for the permitted level of take. Further, ecological
conditions must be specific and objectively verifiable to be upheld.
Finally, FWS must articulate a causal connection between the ecological
conditions and the expected take of the protected species. 149 These
objectively measurable criteria will be easier to review and will provide
permitees with an objective standard by which to judge their actions.
B. Arizona Cattle Growers Severely Restricts FWS's Authority and
Will Significantly Change Agency Procedure by Forcing Greater Proof
of Harm to Species and More Specificity in Permit Conditions
Arizona Cattle Growers severely reduces FWS's regulatory
discretion and authority in several ways. First, by adopting a reasonable
certainty standard, it forces FWS to use a narrower definition of the term
"take" when exercising its authority under section 7. Under its former
interpretation that any possibility of injury or harm was a justification for
an ITS with restrictive conditions, FWS could simply assert a take and
issue an ITS with any conditions it liked. A permitee would have been
hard pressed to challenge the finding or object to the conditions. FWS
must now meet a higher threshold before imposing conditions on
permits. This will place permit applicants in a better position to avoid
conditions in the first place or to challenge implausible conditions.
Second, FWS must now show that the land is occupied by
endangered or threatened species before it can mandate permit
conditions. FWS had previously asserted that it could place conditions
on the land use based on its value as potential habitat. The new standard
reduces FWS's discretion in both what kind of conditions it may issue
and whether it may issue conditions at all. It must now prove that the
land is occupied before issuing conditions; whereas before it could issue
conditions whenever it pleased. Further, since conditions may only
remedy the effects of the take, 150 FWS may only require measures that
will remedy the impact of the take on the species that it can prove will be
taken. Thus, FWS can no longer use the assertion that a species will be
taken to add conditions regarding species that will not be taken. This
149. Id. at 1248. That is, FWS must find that the ecological conditions it imposes would
likely result in a take if they were not imposed. In more concrete terms, FWS cannot find
that factors X and Y cause a take but then determine that take will be deemed exceeded if
factors X, Y, and Z do not improve.
150. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C) (2000).
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provides land users with a much stronger shield against the imposition
of conditions.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the court recognized that
FWS, rather than the permit applicant, bears the burden of proving that
the land was occupied or that a species would be taken. This will be a
tremendous advantage for permitees because it places the costs of
conducting the necessary studies squarely on the agency. Under FWS's
former interpretations, permitees had to prove that the species was not
on the land. 151 Aside from the always difficult task of proving a negative,
the cost involved in generating the necessary studies would be so
prohibitive as to force permitees to accept the conditions. 152 Since FWS
153
suffers from a lack of resources and cannot do the studies itself,
permitees will be in a far better position at the bargaining table. Further,
permitees will have a much better chance when later challenging permit
conditions that they feel are unfair.
Finally, the FWS may no longer burden individuals with general
ecological responsibility for large tracts of government land. By holding
that FWS must generally use numerical values for the anticipated level of
take in an ITS,154 the Ninth Circuit forced FWS to be much more precise
in issuing the conditions and much more vigilant in enforcing them. The
new standard also removes agency discretion by forcing FWS to point to
specific instances of take rather than a generalized finding of ecological
deterioration.
Forcing FWS to come up with the number of anticipated takes
will require the service to justify why they believe that a specific number
of a protected species will be harassed, harmed, injured, or killed before
they may issue conditions related to a take. On the enforcement side,
FWS may no longer find a permitee in violation due to general ecological
deterioration. Before Arizona Cattle Growers, it was possible for the FWS
to revoke permits or impose extra conditions based on a suspicion of
take coupled with a general ecological deterioration. The service must
now show that an excessive number of members of the protected species
have been harmed. This will require monitoring and enforcement
resources that FWS simply does not have. 5 5 The FWS will have to come
151. Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1244.
152. Buckmaster de Wolf, Strange Things Are Afoot at the Circle K: Agency Action Against
Leased Sites in Environmental Bankruptcy, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 145, 162 n.106
(describing environmental costs as "astronomical").
153. See Jane H. Bock & Katy Human, NGOs and the Protection of Biodiversity: The
Ecologists' Views, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 167 (2002).
154. See Ariz. Cattle Growers, 273 F.3d at 1250.
155. Indeed, it will be very difficult for FWS to do any kind of enforcement at all.
Before, the FWS could see a general deterioration, assume there had been a taking, and
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up with a much more cost-effective or creative way to monitor permitted
incidental take or it will be unable to enforce its permit conditions.
III. JUDICIAL BOUNDARIES: ARIZONA CATLE GROWERS IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE DEVELOPING JUDICIAL TREND
TOWARD LIMITED AGENCY DISCRETION UNDER THE ESA
The ESA sets lofty goals and establishes mandatory procedures
that FWS simply cannot meet due to budget restrictions. 156 For example,
critical habitat must be designated for each species within a very short
time of listing. While listing costs relatively little, critical habitat
designations are costly and require significant labor. Given its limited
resources, FWS chooses to concentrate on listing, either ignoring critical
habitat designation or reserving it for some later time. 157 For years, FWS
has been picking and choosing whether and when it would designate
critical habitat, despite the fact that this practice is counter to the fairly
clear language of the Act and has been challenged repeatedly.'58

order it remedied. Now, it appears, the FWS will have to find harmed animals or plants.
Imagine, for example, the following scenario in which FWS determines that a rancher's
cattle are likely to trample fish in a stream. After issuing an ITS, FWS permits the rancher to
take ten fish per year on a 22,000-acre allotment (not unlike the conditions placed on the
gracing allotments at issue in the Arizona Cattle Growers case). Given that the fish are small
and live in rivers and streams, how is FWS supposed to find individual fish that have been
taken? The chances that they will wash away, be eaten by predators or scavengers, or meet
some other fate make the FWS's job very difficult. Factor in the size of the plot and the
problem becomes all the more difficult. Courts may permit an "ecological" barometer in
this type of situation, but very few have shown sympathy when FWS pleads insufficient
resources. But cf. Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998)
(recognizing that "[algency actions are driven (and constrained) as much by agency
funding as by agency policy and statutory directive"). In any event, this is bound to cause
severe problems for FWS.
156. See Bock & Human, supra note 153, at 175 (noting that FWS's enforcement budget
"has been raised to $8 million, but conservation biologists within and outside the FWS
suggest that a budget of $120 million would be required to carry out the task of listing
endangered species properly"). In any case, it is clear that FWS is woefully underfunded to
perform its job to the statutory standard.
157. See Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from
Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalismfor Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 27
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45 (2002) (noting that "the Clinton and George W. Bush
Administrations have argued repeatedly that designation of critical habitat is a needless
and expensive diversion of agency resources with little to no practical benefit to the
species"). The theory that critical habitat is needless is borne out of a belief that listing will
provide the most benefit to the most species. See also Bruce Babbitt, Bush Isn't All Wrong
About the Endangered Species Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2001, § 4, at 11.
158. J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever Expanding Web of Federal Laws
Regulating Non-Federal Lands: Time for Something Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555, 595
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After years of courts expressing displeasure with FWS's
discretion in this area, the Fifth Circuit recently closed the door on FWS's
practice of finding nearly every designation "not prudent" or "not
determinable." 159 In Sierra Club v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service,
the court held that FWS must designate critical habitat within one year of
160
listing, absent rare circumstances.
Sierra Club is even more problematic for FWS in light of another
recent case, New Mexico Cattle Growers v. United States Fish and Wildlife
Service. 161 There, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that FWS must engage in a
full-scale economic analysis of each critical habitat designation. The court
held that, after the economic analysis is completed, FWS must determine
whether the economic burden outweighs the ecological benefit and may
exclude land from critical habitat on that basis. The service had skirted
the economic analysis requirement by using a questionable "baseline"
approach that eliminated most of the economic impacts of designation,
instead attributing them to listing. 162 This greatly reduced the cost of an
analysis and eliminated most of the cost-benefit inquiries. 63 Landowners
and commentators questioned this mode of analysis for years before the
Tenth Circuit invalidated it. 164 After New Mexico Cattle Growers, it is clear
that the FWS must consider every economic effect attributable to critical
habitat designation.
These two cases represent a difficult dilemma for the agency.
Environmental groups sue to force designations within the very brief
statutory time frame and the court orders FWS to comply. Given the
shortage of resources and the costs of both designation and economic
analysis, it is difficult, if not impossible, for FWS to conduct its task
correctly in such a limited time. Rather than face contempt sanctions and

(1995) (observing that FWS has been forced by litigation to designate critical habitat in
many instances).
159. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001).
160. For a full discussion of Sierra Club, see Part A infra.
161. 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001).
162. Id. at 1280.
163. Remember, the FWS "may" choose not to designate an area as critical habitat if the
costs of designation outweigh the benefit to the species. See Part L.C supra. Since FWS
dramatically lowered the economic impacts attributable to the listing by raising the
"baseline," there was no need to determine at what point the economic costs would
outweigh the ecological benefits (and no need to defend such a determination, either way,
in court). If FWS must include all costs attributable to listing, rather than all costs solely
attributable to listing, it becomes much more difficult to ignore the cost-benefit analysis.
164. N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir.
2001).
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further litigation, FWS races to complete the designation and analysis. 165
The end product is usually shoddy work and uses baseline economic
analysis. 166 Groups adversely affected by the designation then sue to
invalidate it and have been highly successful. The FWS ends up back at
square one: a listed species with no critical habitat. Thus, the FWS's
already meager resources are wasted in its bureaucratic two-step
through the courts, which is aimed at avoiding only the most immediate
problems.
A. FWS Must Designate Critical Habitat at the Time of Listing
While FWS has had repeated problems in the critical habitat
arena, the text of section 4 is fairly clear: in almost all circumstances, FWS
must designate critical habitat at the time it lists a species. 167 The FWS
may refuse to designate critical habitat if it is either "not prudent" or
"not determinable." 68 Because the terms are left undefined in the Act
itself, the agency defined them.169 According to the FWS regulations, a
designation is not prudent if it would not be beneficial to the species or if
it would actually harm the species." 170 The regulations state that a
designation is not determinable when either the biological needs of the
species are not known or "information sufficient to perform required
analyses of the impacts of the designation is lacking." 171 If FWS
165. See, e.g., Peter J. Gardner, Owl Redux, VT. B.J. Dec. 28, 2002, at 33, 35 (noting that,
"[iun response to a court order to designate critical habitat in an effort to save the northern
spotted owl, the Bush Administration... moved in April, 1991, to place restrictions on more
than eleven million acres of forest" in a very short time).
166. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 268 F. Supp.
2d 1197, 1227 (E.D. Cal. 2003). In this case, decided well after New Mexico Cattle Growers, the
court-ordered designation was completed in a short time frame, resulting in the use of a
method "for evaluating the economic impacts related to critical habitat designation...'substantially similar' to that utilized by the service in New Mexico Cattle Growers." Id.
The court thus proceeded to strike down the designation. Id. at 1239.
167. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A) (2000) (FWS "shall, concurrently with making a determination.. .that the species is an endangered species or a threatened species, designate any
habitat.. which is then determined to be critical").
168. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2000).
169. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(1) (2002).
170. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12 (2002):
(1) A designation of critical habitat is not prudent when one or both of the
following situations exist:
(i) The species is threatened by taking or other human activity, and
identification of critical habitat can be expected to increase the degree of
such threat to the species, or
(ii) Such designation of critical habitat would not be beneficial to the
species.
171. Id.
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determines that a designation is not prudent, the matter is concluded. If
it decides that a designation is not determinable, it may extend the
period for designation by up to one year. 72
In Sierra Club, FWS failed to designate critical habitat for the
threatened Gulf sturgeon because it determined that critical habitat
designation did not provide additional protection for the species. 173
Instead, FWS determined that designation was "not prudent."'174 The
Sierra Club challenged this finding and objected to FWS's blanket policy
of avoiding critical habitat designation. 75
The reason FWS held this position is somewhat complex. Recall
that the purpose of designating critical habitat is only to ensure that
government actions, rather than private projects, do not have adverse
effects on habitat needed for survival or recovery. 76 FWS regulations
defined adverse modification as that which reduced both survival and
recovery of the species. ' 7 This definition effectively wrote recovery out
of the language, because, by definition, anything that affects survival
also affects recovery but anything that affects only recovery (i.e., does not
affect survival) is insufficient to trigger the protection. Anything that
reduces the chance of survival would cause jeopardy and is banned
under section 7 as soon as a species is listed. FWS regarded critical
habitat designation as merely duplicating the jeopardy protections and,
therefore, viewed designation as a waste of resources. The FWS
determined that designation of critical habitat was "not prudent" under
agency regulations because designation was not "beneficial to the
species." 78
The Sierra Club court held that FWS's judgment that critical
habitat designations did nothing to aid species robbed the statutory text
172. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(A)(ii)(lI) (2000).
173. Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434,436 (5th Cir. 2001).
174. Id. at 437.
175. Id.
176. That is, private persons may destroy critical habitat without punishment unless
their action results in the take of a listed species. An individual or government agency that
adversely modifies habitat may be guilty of a take if there is actual injury or death to a
specific member of the listed species. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). Designation of critical habitat under section 4 thus helps
protect species by forcing the agency to engage in consultation if critical habitat may be
adversely modified and offering reasonable and prudent alternatives to that modification.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2000).
177. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2002) ("Destruction or adverse modification means a direct
or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the
survival and recovery of a listed species. Such alterations include, but are not limited to,
alterations adversely modifying any of those physical or biological features that were the
basis for determining the habitat to be critical.") (emphasis added).
178. Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 437.
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of its meaning and subverted congressional intent. 179 According to the
court, Congress had stated that critical habitat was to be designated at
the time of listing and that "not prudent" determinations should be
limited to situations in which either the designation harmed the species
180
or the particular designation would not aid the particular species.
The court found that the legislative history of the ESA supported
181
the interpretation that FWS must generally designate critical habitat.
The 1978 amendments to the Act added critical habitat and some
members considered "the designation of critical habitat [to be] more
important than the designation of an endangered species itself." 182 In
describing the amendment, its sponsor noted that "[it simply requires
that at the time a species is declared to be threatened or endangered, the
appropriate habitat be designated." 183 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that Congress meant to require critical habitat designation at the time the
4
species was listed unless there was a compelling reason not to do so.18
The Sierra Club court explained that FWS regulations had
improperly defined "adverse modification of critical habitat." 85 Since
critical habitat is aimed at recovery of the species, the court reasoned that
"adverse modification" should be defined as that which is detrimental to
the survival or recovery of the species rather than survival and recovery
of the species. 186 To do otherwise, the court explained, would erase
conservation from the equation, a clear contradiction of the statutory
definition. The court invalidated the "not prudent" decision and struck
down the regulatory definition as facially invalid. 8 7 Thus, the court
179.
180.
181.
182.
"when

Id. at 443.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9467.
See Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 442-43.
Statement of Senator Garn, 124 CONG. REC. S21575 (1978) (noting also that
a Federal land manager begins consideration of a project, or an application for a
permit, it is essential that he know not only of the existence of an endangered species but
also of the extent and nature of the habitat that is critical to the continued existence of that
species").
183. Id.
184. For a laundry list of judicially forced designations, see Darin, supra note 140, at
229-31. Strangely, it seems that Congress never intended to set so many regulations
through litigation. In the debates over the need to make the Act more flexible, Senator
Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming opined that the TVA v. Hill decision would lead to an
avalanche of legal challenges designed "to stop Federal projects as a primary goal and in a
way never intended by Congress." 124 CONG. REC. 9805 (1978) (statement of Sen. Wallop).
Ironically, this was the same year that Congress decided to add the requirements for
designating critical habitat at the time of listing. While trying to avoid one problem with
the Act's inflexibility, Congress seems to have added another.
185. Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 443.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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recognized that critical habitat does provide additional protection for
species by ensuring that their opportunity for recovery is not damaged.
Sierra Club will result in drastic changes in FWS's implementation of the ESA. First, FWS must define adverse modification in terms
of survival or recovery. If a habitat modification adversely affects only a
species' opportunity to recover, it now violates section 7(a)(2). This has
major implications for both designation of critical habitat and the way
section 7 is administered. While this means that FWS must designate
critical habitat, it also means that agencies may no longer authorize,
fund, or carry out activities that will modify critical habitat in a manner
that will affect recovery negatively.
Second, critical habitat designation can no longer be avoided as
"not prudent" on the basis that designation, in general, will not benefit
species. 18 Since a "not determinable" finding only permits a one-year
delay, FWS must now designate critical habitat for all species within one
year of listing regardless of financial constraints. As long as conservation
groups continue to bring suit to force designation, FWS will continue to
lose and will have no choice but to designate habitat for each species.
Post-Sierra Club, FWS must designate critical habitat and cannot
avoid doing so on the grounds that it is not cost-effective. 8 9 However,
given the resource constraints placed upon the agency by Congress, it is
difficult to see how FWS will be able to fulfill its statutory mandates for
designation. FWS will be hard pressed to list any species if all its
resources are focused on designation.9 Since the avalanche of litigation
aimed at forcing critical habitat designation is likely to persist and courts
are rarely sympathetic to FWS's pleas of poverty, 191 environmentalists
will most likely continue to be successful in compelling critical habitat
designation.
188. There still could be situations in which designation is not prudent, but arguably
those would be limited to situations in which the species would be harmed or in which
critical habitat would literally provide no additional benefit. Still, since every species needs
habitat to survive, designation is likely to be beneficial unless sufficient state, local, and
private conservation measures render additional habitat unnecessary.
189. Technically, Sierra Club is only binding in the Fifth Circuit. Other courts, though,
have found Sierra Club's reasoning persuasive. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep't
of the Interior, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (C.D. Cal. 2002). See also N.M. Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d
at 1283. It is likely that this ruling has nationwide implications.
190. See Notice of Intent to Clarify the Role of Habitat in Species Conservation, 64 Fed.
Reg. 31,871, 31,872 (June 14,1999) [hereinafter Notice of Intent].
191. See, e.g., Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding
that lack of agency resources is not a defense to an injunction but may be a defense to a
contempt citation once an injunction issues). But cf. Ctr. for Biological Diversity & Cal.
Native Plant Soc'y v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1221 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (exercising judicial
discretion to consider the FWS's budgetary shortfalls).
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B. New Mexico Cattle Growers: Forcing FWS to Engage in Meaningful
Economic Analysis
FWS's critical habitat procedures have also been challenged for
improperly ignoring the economic impacts of designation. 192 When FWS
designates critical habitat, it is required to prepare an economic impact
analysis detailing the financial effects of designation. 193 FWS may
exclude an area from designation if it determines that the economic
benefits of excluding the area outweigh the ecological benefit of
including the area. 94 In addition, the analysis provides the community
with a way of assessing, in readily understandable terms, the types of
activities that will be restrained and the local impact likely to flow from
195
those restrictions.
In New Mexico Cattle Growers Association v. United States Fish and
Wildlife Service,196 another cattle ranchers' group alleged that FWS was
197
improperly avoiding the economic analysis required for designation.
There, New Mexico Cattle Growers argued that FWS used a legally
insufficient economic analysis that failed to take into account the
"economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any
particular area as critical habitat" as required by the Act. 198
This analysis, known as the "incremental baseline approach,"
takes economic effects caused by both designation and another factor,
such as listing, and moves them below the "baseline," where they are not

192. William Snape III et al., Protecting Ecosystems Under the Endangered Species Act: The
Sonoran Desert Example, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 14, 21-22 (2001) (noting recent challenges based
on improper economic impacts).
193. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000). This section also requires that the designation take
into account "any other relevant impact." While it is still unclear what that means, several
commentators have suggested that it includes effects such as impacts on military training
and readiness. See Amy Armstrong, Critical Habitat Designations Under the Endangered
Species Act: Giving Meaning to the Requirements for Habitat Protections,10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 53,
75 (2002). See also Joseph M. Paths, Paying Tribute to Joseph Heller with the Endangered Species
Act: When Critical Habitat Isn't, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 133, 188 (discussing the different
approaches circuit courts have taken in determining the scope of "any other relevant
impact").
194. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000). Despite this discretion, FWS may not exclude an
area if doing so would result in the extinction of the species. Id.
195. See Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiquesof
Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431, 435 (1996) (noting that "[i]n
important ways, economic analysis of environmental protection measures-and of public
policy measures more generally- set the agenda for debate about the environment").
196. 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001).
197. Id. at 1280-81.
198. Id. at 1282 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)).
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considered in the required analysis. 199 Instead of considering all impacts
of a designation, this approach addresses only those that would not
occur but for the designation, 200 thereby disregarding any impact that
may also result from other causes. The take provision of section 9 bans
the modification of any habitat that results in actual injury to a listed
201
species, regardless of whether the habitat is designated as critical.
Because critical habitat is that which is necessary for survival or
recovery, the FWS claimed that any modification of critical habitat
would result in actual injury and therefore be prohibited by section 9;
that is, any restriction would exist regardless of whether the land was
designated. 2 2 FWS argued that considering the effects that resulted from
both listing and designation would impermissibly inject economic
analysis into the listing process. 20 3 Therefore, FWS excluded them from
the economic analysis. 2°4
In New Mexico Cattle Growers, FWS argued that the designation
would "result in no additional protection for the flycatcher nor have any
additional economic effects beyond those that may have been caused by
listing and by other statutes." 20 5 This approach is predicated on the
theory that designation cannot result in additional burdens to the
community because designation does not provide any benefit to the

199. See Linda A. Malone, Recent Developments Concerning Environmental Law and
Agriculture,7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 341, 350 (2002) (explaining baseline approach). Aside from
listing, other causes permitting exclusion of economic impacts include state law
restrictions. The FWS recently discounted some of the effects of a critical habitat
designation in California because that state's Environmental Quality Act and Endangered
Species Act include restrictions similar to the ESA's listing provisions. See Ruth Langridge,
Changing Legal Regimes and the Allocation of Water Between Two California Rivers, 42 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 283, 301 (2002) (noting that "[tlhe 1970 California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA), the 1970 California Endangered Species Act (CESA), and the 1970 California Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act paralleled their federal counterparts").
200. See N.M. CattleGrowers, 248 F.3d at 1280.
201. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687
(1995).
202. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998); see also Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 852
F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
203. Listing decisions are to be made on the best scientific and commercial data and are
to disregard economics entirely. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000).
204. The theory behind excluding economic effects that are attributable both to listing
and critical habitat designation is that listing of the species (which occurs prior to or simultaneously with the designation) will have economic impacts that must not be considered
and that it would be unfair to account for them in the critical habitat portion of the final
rule.
205. See N.M. Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d at 1280, citing Div. OF ECON., U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
SOUTHWESTERN FLYCATCHER S3 (1997).

OF CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION

FOR THE
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species. 20 6 If FWS had determined that there was a significant burden on
the community, it would then have had to determine whether that
burden outweighed the benefits to the species, a perilous exercise to be
sure. 20 7 However, FWS did not need to determine whether the burden to
the community outweighed the benefit to the species because, under its
approach, there was no measurable economic impact. Conversely, the
New Mexico Cattle Growers argued that the designation had clear
economic effects, regardless of whether these effects provided additional
benefits. 20 8 They argued that FWS's interpretation essentially wrote
20 9
meaningful economic analysis out of the ESA.
While the ESA mandates that FWS conduct an economic
analysis, it does not lay out the procedures for doing so and does not
indicate which factors must be counted and which factors may be
ignored. FWS argued that its interpretation was reasonable and deserved
deference in light of Chevron.210 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, announcing
that it would determine Congress's intent using "traditional tools of
statutory interpretation." 211 The court first noted that Chevron deference
was not due in this case "[b]ecause the statutory interpretation resulting
in the baseline approach ha[d] never undergone the formal rule making
206. This is partly because FWS had effectively excluded recovery from the definition of
"adverse modification" as mentioned previously in Part III.A supra. See also 50 C.F.R. §
402.14 (2002). Since it added no further protections, the logic goes, it could have no further
impacts. Note that Sierra Club, 245 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001), flatly rejected the theory that
designation results in no additional protections. This should further weaken, if not cripple,
FWS's argument that designation has no additional impacts. It is not clear whether the
FWS will revise its opinion regarding additional burdens in light of Sierra Club, but it has
not developed a different method of analysis thus far. See Economic & Planning Systems,
Inc., Final Draft Report: Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designation for the Baker's and
Yellow Larkspurs, at http://sacramento.fws.gov/ea/Documents/Larkspurs%20EA%20
draft.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (using essentially the same baseline test rejected in New
Mexico Cattle Growers but attributing the costs generated by listing to other questionable
factors).
207. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000). It is important to note that the Act permits, but
does not require, FWS to exclude areas from designation if the burden outweighs the
benefit. See id. ("The Secretary may exclude any area from critical habitat if he determines
that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of
the critical habitat....") (emphasis added). Still, it is hard to imagine a situation in which
such a decision would not be arbitrary and capricious or the subject of great outrage in the
impacted community.
208. See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 21, N.M. Cattle Growers (No. 98-0275-BB/DJS-ACE)
[hereinafter Plaintiff's Brief]; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation at 10,
N.M. Cattle Growers (No. 98-0275-BB/DJS-ACE) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief].
209. See Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 208, at 18; see also Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note
208, at 8.
210. N.M. CattleGrowers, 248 F.3d at 1281.
211. Id. (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
446, (1987)).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

process."212 Interpretations not adopted in a formal rulemaking are not
entitled to Chevron deference but are useful only to the extent that they
213
persuade the court.
The court dismissed the baseline approach, finding it "not in
accord with the language or intent of the ESA." 214 It characterized FWS's
approach as a "but for" method, noting that, under the baseline
approach, "unless an economic impact would not result but for the
[Critical Habitat Designation (CHD)], that impact is attributable to a
different cause (typically listing) and is not an 'economic impact.. .of
specifying any particular area as critical habitat.' ' 215 According to the
court, this policy resulted from an improper regulatory definition of
"adverse modification," because the "root of the problem" was FWS's
position that designations provided no benefit to the species. 216 Rather,
the court emphasized that designation creates additional protections for
217
species as well as burdens on landowners.
Further, the court explained that Congress intended for all
critical habitat designations to include economic analyses, 218 despite
FWS's argument that abandoning the baseline approach would be
"injecting economic analysis into the listing decision." 219 In fact, the
panel concluded, Congress must have intended this kind of balancing
when it placed the cost-benefit language into the critical habitat
212. Id.
213. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995). But cf. Martin v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (" [Wihether the Secretary has consistently
applied the interpretation embodied in the citation [is] a factor bearing on the
reasonableness of the Secretary's position."). Note that the courts in New Mexico Cattle
Growers, Arizona Cattle Growers, and Sierra Club also failed to grant Chevron deference and
did so for a different reason. This is an emerging trend, especially in the area of natural
resources, and deserves far more exploration than I can afford to give it in this article.
Suffice it to say, however, that three different courts of appeals (the Tenth, Ninth, and Fifth
Circuits) have found different ways around Chevron. This leads one to conclude that, at the
very least, Chevron deference has been considerably diminished.
214. N.M. Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d at 1285.
215. Id. at 1283 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (emphasis added).
216. Id. The court also indicated substantial agreement with the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Sierra Club but noted that the regulations defining adverse modification were not
properly before the court. Id. This is a strong suggestion that the Tenth Circuit would also
be inclined to strike down FWS's regulatory definition of "adverse modification."
217. Id. at 1284 ("[Tlhe fact that the FWS says that no real impact flows from the CHD
does not make it so.").
218. Id. at 1285.
219. Id. The argument is that the protections of critical habitat and listing overlap and
that counting the effects that overlap will somehow count the effects of listing. This is
preposterous, because the only thing the economic analysis can affect is whether particular
land is designated as critical habitat. Even if all land is excluded as too costly, the listing
and its attendant protections remain.
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provision.220 Acknowledging the possibility that its decision could end
up excluding certain areas from designation, 221 the court of appeals then
set aside the designation, remanded the case to the district court, and
instructed FWS to issue a new critical habitat designation and a proper
economic analysis. 222
Significantly, the court of appeals held that FWS must consider
all effects of designation even if they are "co-extensive" with other
causes. 223 According to the court, Congress intended FWS to consider not
only the economic effects but also the effects of listing. 224 Thus, if listing
causes $100 million in effects and designation causes $25 million, it is
insufficient for FWS to consider only the $25 million. Rather, it must look
at the incremental effect of that $25 million considering that the total
225
damage is $125 million.
FWS has since conceded that the decision in New Mexico Cattle
Growers is correct, has "voluntarily" vacated other critical habitat
designations as improper, and has applied the Tenth Circuit's ruling
nationwide.22 6 The implications of this decision are monumental and
220. Id. ("Congress intended that the FWS conduct a full analysis of all of the economic
impacts of a critical habitat designation, regardless of whether those impacts are
attributable co-extensively to other causes."). The logical limit of this principle is unclear.
Must FWS consider an effect that flows mostly from listing? Seventy-five percent from
listing? Fifty percent? This will have to be clarified in future litigation. But see Amicus
Curiae Brief, supra note 208, at 12 (arguing that FWS must "avoid needless economic
dislocation produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently pursuing their
environmental objectives)" (quoting Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176-77 (1997)).
221. N.M. Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d at 1285.
222. Id. at 1286.
223. Id. at 1285.
224. Id. ("Congress intended that the FWS conduct a full analysis of all of the economic
impacts of a critical habitat designation.").
225. The difference of forcing FWS to place the impacts of designation in context could
be quite significant. In the above hypothetical, the old analysis would have FWS weighing
$25 million in impacts against the benefit to the species. Difficult as that is, the question is
further complicated by looking at the actual impact of that $25 million, considering that the
community has already suffered $100 million in damages due to the listing. That $25
million could well be the straw that breaks the camel's back, sending businesses into
bankruptcy and so forth.
226. See, e.g., Bldg. Indus. Legal Def. Found. v. Norton, 231 F. Supp. 2d 100, 104 (D.D.C.
2002). See also Ctr. for Biological Diversity & Cal. Native Plant Soc'y v. Norton and Bldg.
Indus. Legal Def. Found. v. Norton (consolidated), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2002). In
both Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation and Centerfor Biological Diversity, FWS asked
the court to permit voluntary remand of the designation to fix the economic analysis
problems. The voluntariness of these vacations, however, is clouded, as FWS has only
vacated its designations as the result of lawsuits. Further, it appears that FWS has only
slightly changed its practices. Though it no longer uses the same baseline approach, it has
simply shifted to another baseline approach, again discounting effects that are also
attributable to other causes. See Economic & Planning Systems, Inc., Draft Report, Economic
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affect every critical habitat designation ever made. If an impact arises
from a designation, even only partially, New Mexico Cattle Growers
demands that FWS consider it. More importantly, because FWS has used
the baseline approach in almost every designation, New Mexico Cattle
Growers suggests that those designations may be illegal and may be
struck down if challenged. 227 Thus, this decision potentially calls into
question the validity of every existing critical habitat designation.
C. The Cumulative Effect of Arizona Cattle Growers,Sierra Club, and
New Mexico Cattle Growers Is a Significant Blow to FWS's Discretion
and Will Seriously Alter Agency Practice
When read together, these three cases severely limit FWS's
discretion and force the agency to work strictly within the statutory
framework of the ESA. Arizona Cattle Growers significantly reduced
FWS's ability to place environmental conditions on permits by creating a
high standard for the FWS to meet. Before issuing an ITS with
conditions, the FWS must show that a take is reasonably certain to occur
and may not rely on unsupported estimates. Any mandatory conditions
must be related to the take. 2 If a take is reasonably certain to occur,
FWS must produce either a specific number of takes that will be
permitted or demonstrate why it is not possible to articulate the
quantity. FWS may no longer issue permit conditions at will, shifting the
burden of ecosystem protection onto private parties. Neither may it set
vague standards for determining when the authorized level of take has
been exceeded, leaving FWS free to find a violation based on nonspecific
factors. Rather, FWS must now issue ITSs only when appropriate and
must be as clear as possible in voicing the standards and conditions. This

Analysis of CriticalHabitat Designationfor Vernal Pool Species, at http://sacramento.fws.gov/
ea/Documents/DraftVernalPoolSpeciesEArev.pdf (last visited May 14, 2004). It is unlikely
that this analysis will withstand judicial scrutiny, given the general language of New Mexico
Cattle Growers.
227. Again, this decision's precedential value is technically limited to the Tenth Circuit.
Since FWS has indicated its agreement with the general premise, however, these challenges
will continue to be brought and will continue to be successful.
228. This language is reminiscent of the terminology used in the land use cases Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994). In these two cases, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a permit condition on land use
was invalid unless it bore a substantial relationship to the impact of the proposed use and
was roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed use. In the environmental context,
one could argue that FWS may not issue a permit condition through an ITS unless it is
substantially related to the impact of the take and proportional to the impact of the take.
One could reasonably say that Arizona Cattle Growers is both the Nollan and Dolan of
Incidental Take Permitting.
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will provide applicants and business people the thing they want most in
conducting their affairs: greater certainty.
While Arizona Cattle Growers will alter agency practices by
forcing more objectivity in permit conditions, Sierra Club and New Mexico
Cattle Growers constitute a total disaster for FWS when read together.
After these decisions, FWS must designate critical habitat with almost
every listing and environmental groups will sue to force them to do so if
necessary. With short, court-ordered deadlines and too few resources,
FWS will continue to rush, failing to complete an in-depth economic
analysis for each designation. Since the reason FWS was not doing
critical habitat designations in the first place was a lack of resources, 229 it
is difficult to see how the FWS will be able to comply with New Mexico
Cattle Growers. An appropriate economic analysis is costly and will be all
the more difficult to produce given the landslide of designation-forcing
lawsuits that are certain to follow these two cases. 230 Environmental
groups will no doubt press forward with their attempts to force
designations while landowners and affected parties will not back away
from their efforts to overturn the resulting hasty, unscientific, and
potentially disastrous designations. FWS no longer has the discretion to
avoid designating habitat and it may not pick and choose which
economic effects to count and which to ignore. This will place the FWS in
an impossible position in which it will not be able to do much of
anything without losing a lawsuit. 231
229. See Susan D. Daggett, NGOs as Lawmakers, Watchdogs, Whistle-blowers, and Private
Attorneys General, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 99, 111 (2002) ("Because of the huge
number of court orders and injunctions obtained against the FWS and because of the
limited budget available for listing activities, environmental organizations and litigators
now control virtually all of the FWS' listing activities."). Daggett points out that
environmental groups are setting the agenda at FWS, creating an environment of
regulatory chaos. See id. She argues that, while the result may be ad hoc, this could actually
result in greater benefits to the species. See id. at 112 ("On the other hand, citizen-driven
prioritization is not necessarily bad from an environmental standpoint, because the species
that citizen groups tend to care about are those that make the biggest difference from an
ecological standpoint."). The corollary to this is, of course, that industry groups will be just
as eager to challenge these hastily made designations. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of N.
Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief brought to overturn the designation of critical habitat for
the Alameda whipsnake). See also Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, No. 99-CIV-000903-PHX-SRB, 2001 WL 1876349 (D. Ariz. 2001) (Order Vacating and Remanding the
Critical Habitat Designation for the Cactus ferruginous pygmy-owl).
230. Indeed, this point receives further discussion in Part III. It is an emerging area in
which industry groups and affected landowners are seeking to invalidate critical habitat.
For the moment, FWS has apparently refused to engage in a meaningful economic analysis
despite its apparent concession that New Mexico Cattle Growers was correctly decided.
231. Possible solutions to this dilemma are listed in Part V infra but are unlikely to occur
given the political problems involved in amending the Act.
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In fact, this precise scenario has recently transpired in Northern
California, where FWS was forced to designate habitat through litigation
and then had the designation invalidated in a second suit. In May of
2003, a federal district court struck down the hasty designation of habitat
for the Alameda whipsnake in Home Builders Association of Northern
California v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service.232 Originally, FWS
listed the whipsnake without designating critical habitat and environmental groups sued to force that designation in 1999.233 The FWS settled
the case that same year and agreed to propose critical habitat by March 21,
2000, with a final designation no later than September 1 of that year. 3
The FWS published a final rule designating critical habitat for the snake
on October 3, 2000. 235
Approximately seven months later, a group of private
landowners, trade associations, and the state chamber of commerce
brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to
overturn the designation on several grounds. 23 6 The FWS agreed that the
rule failed to comply with the ESA and sought voluntary remand, which
the plaintiffs opposed because it would have left the admittedly invalid
rule in place during the remand period. 237 Judge Ishii of the Eastern
District of California ruled that he did not have discretion to keep the old
it down on several
designation in place during remand and struck
238
grounds, including faulty economic analysis.
In a rather embarrassing opinion for FWS, Judge Ishii held that
the FWS "failed to complete the basic tasks required under the ESA to
designate as critical habitat." 23 9 The court agreed with the plaintiffs that
FWS did not follow the economic analysis required by New Mexico Cattle
Growers,24° and that, because it was rushed to designate, the service failed
to
(1) identify the "physical or biological features" that are
"essential to the conservation of the species;" (2) identify
232. 268 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
233. Id.at 1203.
234. Id.
235. Id. See also Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the Alameda Whipsnake
(Masticophis lateralis euryxanthus), 65 Fed. Reg. 58,933 (Oct. 3, 2000).
236. Home BuildersAss'n, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1203.
239. Id. at 1204.
240. Id. at 1209. FWS could hardly have complied with New Mexico Cattle Growers, as the
opinion was issued after the designation for the whipsnake. That this rule was issued postNew Mexico Cattle Growers highlights the fact that each designation issued before New
Mexico Cattle Growers used the same analysis and is therefore of suspect legality.
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the "specific areas within the geographical area occupied
by the species" where the essential "physical or biological
features" are found; (3) determine that those "specific
areas" where the essential features are found "may require
some special management considerations or protection;"
and (4) identify the "geographical area occupied by the
species" at the time the species was listed. Plaintiffs
contend that the [FWS] has not adequately accomplished
any of these necessary tasks. 241
Judge Ishii questioned how FWS could purport to determine the
specific areas occupied by the species that contained the essential
physical and biological features without determining which physical and
biological features the species required. 242 In addition to the New Mexico
Cattle Growers grounds, Judge Ishii struck down the rule because FWS
failed to conduct the site-specific analysis required to determine which
specific parcels of land were critical habitat and which were not. 243 Judge
Ishii's ruling forces the FWS to engage in the time-consuming process of
analyzing whether each parcel of land within the designation area is
actually critical habitat, rather than simply designating a large area
around lands thought to contain critical habitat.244
This represents the worst of all possible scenarios for FWS:
environmentalists sue to force a designation on a short time frame.
Certain to lose the suit, FWS settles and designates quickly but sloppily.
When parties injured by the designation bring suit to overturn the
designation, FWS must concede that it was done illegally and invalidate
it. Like the whipsnake case, all this process accomplishes is a waste of
both time and the very limited resources of FWS's budget. 245
With the massive backlog of listed species for which FWS has
not designated critical habitat, 246 it appears that environmentalists will
241. Id. at 1204.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1207.
244. Id.
245. Note that the process took four years from the filing of the complaint to force
designation to the final decision that overturned the designation. Id. at 1202. In the
meantime, FWS was forced to spend its scarce resources on legal fees and human resources
to complete the designation and fight the suits, yet the whipsnake was in no better position
in May of 2003 than it was in May of 1999.
246. There are nearly 300 species classified as either "proposed" or "candidate" species
as of January 1, 2003. See Threatened and Endangered Species System (TESS), at http:
//ecos.fws.gov/tess-public/TESSWebpageNonlisted?listings=O&type=both (last modified
May 14, 2004). FWS and NMFS have designated critical habitat for only 450 of the more
than 1200 eligible species. See id. at http://ecos.fws.gov/tess-public/TESSWebpage (last
visited May 14, 2004).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

247
A large portion of the budget is
continue to set the agenda at FWS.
consumed by lawsuits to force critical habitat, the resulting designations,
and further lawsuits to overturn the designations. This formula leaves
little, if any, resources for listing species. Thus, these suits to force critical
habitat designation actually have a negative effect on overall species
protection in that they divert resources meant for species protections,
24
including listing, into designations and lawsuits. 8

IV. THE JUDICIAL TREND LIMITING FWS'S DISCRETION AND
AUTHORITY WILL CONTINUE
The FWS's discretion and authority regarding critical habitat
have been severely crippled by the aforementioned cases. Still, two areas
of FWS's designation process present fertile ground for further legal
challenges. First, while FWS is charged with specifying particular areas
249
as critical habitat rather than designating wide swaths of land, FWS
rarely engages in the kind of site-specific "surgical" designations that the

247. FWS allocated all of the fiscal year 2001 listing budget for Region 2 to complying
with court orders and settlement agreements. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 163 F.
Supp. 2d 1297, 1301 (D.N.M. 2001). One must only look at the numbers to understand the
degree to which environmental groups are setting FWS's agenda. Congress placed a $9
million cap on FWS listing activities for FY 2002, along with a sub-cap of $6 million for
critical habitat determinations for already-listed species. FWS anticipates that it will spend
the entire $6 million critical habitat sub-cap to comply with pending court orders and
settlement agreements. Ctr.for Biological Diversity & Cal. Native Plant Soc'y, 212 F. Supp. 2d
at 1221. The court went on to note that "in FY 2002, the Region 1 Office must work on
critical habitat determinations for approximately 290 species to comply with court orders
and court approved settlements." Id. at 1223. This is a significant part of the reason why
FWS listed a meager 11 species in 2001. See Number of U.S. Species Listings Per Calendar Yeaer
(as of Dec. 31, 2001), at http://endangered.fws.gov/stats/List-cy200l.PDF (last visited May
14, 2004).
248. For example, FWS recently announced that it cannot list an endangered species of
Yosemite toad due to budgetary problems, although FWS found that nearly one-half of the
toad population has disappeared. 12-Month Finding for a Petition to List the Yosemite
Toad, 67 Fed. Reg. 75,834 (Dec. 10, 2002). See also Don Thompson, Money Woes Endanger
Yosemite Toad, Government Says, SFGATE.COM (Dec. 10, 2002), at www.sfgate.com/cgi93
0ESTO13.DTL (last visited May 14,
bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2002/12/10/state
2004). Failing to understand that it is at least partially responsible for the current state of
affairs, the Center for Biological Diversity "promise[d] the decision 'will just land them
back in court."' Don Thompson, Money Woes Endanger Yosemite Toad, Government Says,
ASSOcIATED PRESS, Dec. 10, 2002, available at http://www.yosemite.org/newsroom/clips
2002/december/121002.htm (last visited May 24, 2004). The Center has sued to force
several designations that have been challenged, including habitat for the Alameda
whipsnake. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Alameda Whipsnake, available at http://www.swcenter.org/swcbd/species/whipsnake/index.html (last visited May 14, 2004).
249. See 16 U.S.C. § 1633(b)(2) (2000).
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Act suggests it should, due to its lack of resources. 2m Only land essential
to the conservation of the species may be designated. 251 FWS may not
generally designate "the entire geographical area which can be
occupied." 252 Secondly, FWS designates "supporting lands" that it deems
necessary for the survival of the species, even though these supporting
lands can never be occupied by the species and such designation is
arguably contrary to Congress's intent. 253 These frequent "overdesignations" are likely to be challenged and, given the trend towards
cutting agency authority and discretion, may well be overturned.
A. FWS's "Over-Designation" of Critical Habitat Is Ripe for Challenge
FWS must designate critical habitat at the time the species is
listed. 254 In order for FWS to designate habitat as critical, the habitat
must be essential to the conservation of the species. 2s5 However, section
3(5)(C) states that most potential habitat is rarely critical. Rather, "except
in those circumstances determined by the Secretary, critical habitat shall
not include the entire geographical area which can be occupied by the
threatened or endangered species." 256 Even assuming that this means
essential to the recovery of the species, 257 it still must be essential rather
than just useful or beneficial. 258
250. See, e.g., Proposed Critical Habitat Designation for Four Vernal Pool Crustaceans
and Eleven Vernal Pool Plants in California and Southern Oregon, 67 Fed. Reg. 59,884
(Sept. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Fairy shrimp Designation]. Indeed, the service has frequently
complained that site specific designation "needs to be a much less labor intensive process."
Notice of Intent, supra note 190, at 31,873.
251. See 16 U.S.C. § 1632(5)(A) (2000).
252. 16 U.S.C. § 1632(5)(C) (2000).
253. See Fairy shrimp Designation, supra note 250, at 59,899. The endangered Fairy
shrimp requires "vernal" or seasonal pools for its habitat. If the surrounding uplands are
modified to interfere with water run-off, the vernal pools cannot exist and, thus, neither
can the species. Even though the fairy shrimp can never occupy the uplands, FWS
designates them anyway. See id.
254. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (2000).
255. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (2000).
256. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(C) (2000).
257. Conservation and recovery have essentially the same meaning under the Act.
Conservation is defined in the Act as "the use of all methods and procedures which are
necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer necessary." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3)
(2000). Recovery is defined in FWS regulations as "improvement in the status of listed
species to the point at which listing is no longer appropriate under the criteria set out in
section 4(a)(1) of the Act." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002). Environmental groups have
persuasively argued that the use of the phrase "essential to the conservation of the species"
in the definition of critical habitat means that designation should include lands that are
necessary for conservation, not just survival. See Ray Vaughn, State of Extinction: The Case of
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Further, the legislative history of section 3(5)(C) clarifies that all
potential habitat is usually not critical habitat. Senator Jake Gain (R-Utah),
in offering the critical habitat amendment, specifically stated, "it is also
my intent that the extent of the term 'critical habitat' not necessarily be
coterminous with the entire range of the.. .species. In fact, I would expect
259
The House of Representatives'
in most cases that it would not be."
reports also indicate agreement with Senator Gain's intentions. In
explaining its purpose for defining the term "critical habitat" for the first
time, the Merchant Marines and Fisheries Committee stated,
In the committee's view, the regulatory definition could
conceivably lead to the designation of virtually all of the
habitat of a listed species as its critical habitat. Under the
definition of critical habitat in H.R. 14104 (the House bill
that eventually amended the act), air, land or water areas
would be designated critical habitat only if their loss would
significantly decrease the likelihood of conserving the species in
question. The committee believes that this definition
narrows the scope of the term as it is defined in the existing
260
regulations.
Thus, both the text and legislative history of the amendment make it
clear that all potential habitat is not critical.
Although FWS's own regulations acknowledge the distinction
between critical and potential habitat, FWS frequently blurs the line
between the two.261 For example, in a recent omnibus rule for 15 species
the Alabama Sturgeon and Ways Opponents of the Endangered Species Act Thwart Protectionfor
Rare Species, 46 ALA. L. REV. 569 (1995) (arguing "the designation of 'critical habitat' for
species listed under the ESA and the development of 'recovery plans' for each of those
species are the main mechanisms in section 4 for accomplishing the goal of recovery"). But
cf. Kristin M. Fletcher & Sharonne E. O'Shea, Essential Fish Habitat: Does Calling It Essential
Make It So?, 30 ENVTL. L. 51, 80 (2000) (arguing that the FWS has discretion to limit the
designation to survival alone). Others disagree with that formulation, but as it seems to
follow from the plain text of the Act, I will proceed on the basis that critical habitat indeed
contains a recovery element.
258. While that seems obvious, FWS has had a difficult time justifying which lands are
essential, as opposed to those that are merely suitable but not essential. The dictionary
defines essential as "of, relating to, or constituting essence: inherent; of the utmost
importance: basic, indispensable, necessary." "Useful," on the other hand, is "capable of
being put to use; esp.: serviceable for an end or a purpose." MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1297 (10th ed. 1993).
259. See Statement of Senator Garn, supranote 182.
260. H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9475
(emphasis added).
261. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(e) (2002) ("[Tlhe Secretary shall designate as critical habitat
areas outside the geographic area presently occupied by the species only when a
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of endangered and threatened Fairy shrimp and plants, FWS proposed
designation of almost two million acres of critical habitat in California. 262
In making the proposal, the FWS flatly admitted that "no experimental
studies have been conducted to determine the specific habitat
requirements of longhorn fairy shrimp." 263 FWS attempted to solve this
problem by limiting the designation to land currently occupied by the
species, but simple occupation of habitat is not enough to make it critical.
If land is occupied, it must also possess physical and biological features
essential to the conservation of the species and must at least potentially
require special management considerations. 264 However, FWS never
conducted studies to determine the specific habitat requirements of the
species nor explained how it determined the management plan for the
land.265

Instead, FWS should have issued a "not determinable" finding,
extending the timeline for designation by one year.266 This would have
permitted FWS to collect or generate the information necessary to

designation limited to its present range would be inadequate to ensure the conservation of
the species."). The source of this "blurring" of the lines is that the statute requires FWS to
determine what habitat is critical for the recovery of the species before it has had a chance
to determine what recovery will be for that particular species. For a thorough discussion of
this problem, see Perry E. Hicks, Designation Without Conservation: The Conflict Between the
Endangered Species Act and Its Implementing Regulations, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 491 (2000)
(arguing that the Interior Department's regulations seem to conflict with the text of the
Act.). Hicks's article, published in 2000, foresaw the decision in Sierra Club. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Hicks and struck down the regulations.
262. The designation actually included some land in Oregon as well, but only in one
county. The vast majority of the designation is in 36 California counties, stretching from
Redding to Riverside. See Gregory T. Broderick, Fish & Wildlife's Anti-people Agenda, at
http://www.cppf.org/CPR/Columns/1106JAntiPeopleAgenda.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2004).
263. Fairy shrimp Designation, supra note 250, at 59,900.
264. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (2000).
265. While it is understandable for FWS to designate land that is occupied by the
species, it defies logic to say that one may determine the features that are "essential to the
conservation of the species" without knowing the specific habitat requirements of the
species. It is a further mystery how FWS determined that the land may require special
management considerations if one does not know the way in which land must be managed
to protect the species.
266. The FWS must make the decision whether to list a species within one year of
receiving a petition to list and finding that such a petition may be warranted. 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b)(3)(B) (2000). If it decides to list, the FWS must publish a final rule designating
critical habitat within one year. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(A) (2000). If critical habitat is not then
determinable, FWS may extend the period for designation by one year. 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2000). See also Darin, supra note 140, at 221.
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267
determine critical habitat in a scientific and legal manner. If FWS were
then unwilling or unable to collect the information to make the
designation, environmental groups would then likely have been able to
268
force the designation through litigation. On the other hand, if FWS
were to make a designation based on little or no scientific information
before collecting adequate data, it would be open to an attack that its
269
actions were arbitrary and capricious. This example illustrates how the
requirements of section 3(5)(C) and section 4(a)(3)(A) put FWS in the
impossible position of following a court order to designate when it
knows that any designation is likely to be overturned by yet another
court.

B. Supporting Lands: May They Be Designated as Critical Habitat
Even Though They Can Never Be Occupied?
Another area in which FWS will soon face litigation is in
designating "supporting" lands as critical habitat. In the recent omnibus
Fairy shrimp designation, FWS designated occupied pools, unoccupied
270
upland areas, and swales. While only the seasonal vernal pools are
actually inhabited by the species, FWS asserted that protecting the pools
271
Further,
alone was insufficient to maintain and recover the species.
conservathe
for
"essential
FWS argued that the supporting lands were
267. See Darin, supra note 140, at 228 (arguing that FWS has a duty to collect data in
making critical habitat decisions). It appears that the "not determinable" finding is only an
extension that imposes an affirmative duty on FWS.
268. Indeed, both Sierra Club and the vernal pool designation proceeded more or less on
these grounds. See Fairy shrimp Designation, supra note 250, at 59,884. See also Sierra Club
v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 436-38 (5th Cir. 2001).
269. Indeed, this is a growing threat for FWS. Though the statute states that
designations must be made on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data
available, there must be some data available. It is doubtful that guessing or extrapolation
would pass muster under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
270. Swales are low-level drainage ways.
271. See Fairy shrimp Designation, supra note 250, at 59,899. Although the uplands are
not actually occupied by vernal pool crustaceans, they nevertheless are essential to the
conservation of vernal pool habitat and crustaceans because they maintain the aquatic
phase of vernal pools and swales. Associated uplands are also essential to provide
nutrients that form the basis of the vernal pool food chain, including a primary food source
for the vernal pool crustaceans. Id. In other cases, altering the supporting lands will cause
the pools to occur year round. Id. While this may sound good, year round water makes the
area attractive to the Fairy shrimp's natural predators and, therefore, causes the habitat to
be unsuitable for Fairy shrimp. It is important, therefore, to have uplands that "contribute
to the filling and drying of the vernal pool, and maintain suitable periods of pool
inundation, water quality, and soil moisture for vernal pool crustacean hatching, growth
and reproduction, and dispersal, but not necessarily every year." Id. Upland areas are also
"a source of nutrients for vernal pool organisms." Id. at 59,885.
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tion of the species" because they helped provide nutrients and helped
regulate both the timing and amount of water in the vernal pools. 272 The
FWS, therefore, designated the entire "vernal pool complex" as critical
habitat,273 even while characterizing the habitat as unoccupied. 274
Although it has no set definition of vernal pool complex, the FWS notes,
A landscape that supports a vernal pool complex is
typically grassland, with areas of obstructed drainage that
form the pools. Vernal pools can also be found in a variety
of other habitats, including woodland, desert, and
chaparral. The pools may be fed or connected by low
drainage pathways called "swales." Swales are often
themselves seasonal wetlands that remain saturated for
much of the wet season, but may not be inundated long
enough to develop strong vernal pool characteristics.275
The FWS also asserts that designating the uplands is necessary because
some vernal pools may not occur at the right time and for the proper
duration if the surrounding area is not maintained appropriately. 276
There remains a strong argument, however, that FWS is
unauthorized to designate supporting lands. After all, it is highly
unlikely that Congress intended critical habitat to include land that a
species could never occupy if it did not intend for FWS to designate all
land that a species could occupy. While "essential for the conservation of
the species" is not defined in the statute, the term "habitat" must have a
logical stopping point. Looking at the legislative history, it is clear that
Congress only authorized FWS to designate land as unoccupied habitat
if it could in fact later be occupied by the species. The committee reports,
for example, caution FWS to "be exceedingly circumspect in the
designation of critical habitat outside of the presently occupied area of
the species." 277 Given Congress's warning, it appears that FWS is
designating as critical habitat land that is not habitat at all. 278 The

272. Id. at 59,899 (uplands areas are essential "because they maintain the aquatic phase
of vernal pools and swales. Associated uplands are also essential to provide nutrients that
form the basis of the vernal pool food chain, including a primary food source for the vernal
pool crustaceans.").
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 59,885.
276. Id. at 59,900.
277. H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, at 18 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453,9468.
278. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 268 F. Supp.
2d 1197, 1215 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that FWS "admi[tted] that some areas within the
critical habitat boundary are not actually critical habitat").
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practice of designating these "supporting lands" exceeds agency
authority and may soon be struck down.
Further, it is easy to see how an overeager FWS employee might
279
given the intricate
push the concept of "supporting lands" too far,
280
Sierra Club,
Growers,
Cattle
Mexico
New
As
interrelationships in nature.
279. This is the "one ecosystem" theory that proceeds on the basis that every
modification of nature affects every other part of nature. By writing this article, for
example, I have (needlessly) caused several trees to be cut down and turned into a paper
sacrifice to the gods of legal scholarship. Cutting down these trees has eternally and
irreversibly altered the natural landscape and thus has changed the ecosystem forever.
While this is obviously the "one ecosystem" theory taken to its extreme, it is hard to see the
logical stopping point for the concept of supporting lands. If this seems so attenuated that
no reasonable person would advance such a theory, it is less so than some of the theories
put forth to explain how the Commerce Clause power justifies the ESA's application to
"intrastate" species. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does
the Endangered Species Act Encroach on the Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer
Limits of the Conmerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 783-93 (2002).
Under the biodiversity rationale for aggregation, individual species are
important only in that each species potentially affects the preservation of
large numbers of species. Many species that lack individual commercial
value perform important "ecosystem services" such as the decomposition
of organic matter, renewal of soil, mitigation of floods, purification of air
and water, or partial stabilization of climatic variation.... Because the
preservation of as many endangered species and threatened species as
possible significantly affects interstate commerce by maintaining
biodiversity, the aggregation of all endangered and threatened species is
justifiable under the Wickard rule.
Id. at 78687. See also Dave Owen, Gibbs v. Babbitt, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 377 (2001) (arguing that
aggregate effects supply the necessary Commerce Clause connection for the ESA). But see
John C. Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 174, 199-204 (1998) (arguing that Wickard and Court interpretations through Lopez do
not extend far enough to support the biodiversity/ecosystem argument for regulation
under the Commerce Clause).
280. It must also be noted that sometimes scientists lose sight of process in favor of the
laudable goal of species protection. One need only think back to the example of
government scientists taking hair from a lynx at an animal preserve and planting it in an
area that was being surveyed for lynx protection. See BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2002, at A2.
This story did not go unnoticed in Congress. See 148 CONG. REC. H1324-01 (daily ed. Apr.
16, 2002) (statement of Rep. Osborne) (The former University of Nebraska football coach
noted that, "according to testimony, others within government agencies were aware of the
planted lynx hair and did not report it."). The biologists explain that they "submitted three
samples of lynx fur they falsely labeled as having been collected in two Washington state
national forests to test the lab's ability to analyze lynx DNA." Audrey Hudson, GAO: Lynx
Fur Hoax Was No Secret, WASH. TIMES, available at http://www.cdfe.org/lynxhoaxnosecret.htm.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2004). However, the GAO has reported that
"government scientists knew they should not have submitted falsely labeled samples into a
national lynx survey and that some supervisors were aware but took no action." Id. This
indicates that some FWS employees may be willing to break the law in order to designate
greater areas as critical habitat. Given the breadth of the "supporting lands" concept, the
temptation to extend designation will likely also be great.
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and Arizona Cattle Growers illustrate, courts have been increasingly
skeptical of FWS's authority, especially where it asserts boundless
discretion. In light of these recent rulings, courts are likely to invalidate
the above practices.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: CAN REASONABLE, ECOLOGICALLY
SENSIBLE MEASURES OVERCOME POLITICS?
As the discussion above illustrates, FWS either needs more
funding for the listing process or more time to designate critical habitat
to comply with these rulings. 281 As recently noted by administration
officials, the Act is "broken" and in need of reform, 282 but a legislative
solution remains unlikely. Senator Lincoln Chafee (R-R.I.), for instance,
recently proposed moving designation of critical habitat to the recovery
planning stage and setting a timetable for recovery plans.28 3 This would
permit designation at the time of listing only if FWS found that it was
essential to avoid species extinction. 284 Recognizing that critical habitat
designations are time sensitive, expensive, and backlogged, the Chafee
proposal would have prohibited suits for a reasonable period of time
and formed a "priority ranking system for the development and revision

281. To give one an idea of how "little" the federal government actually spends on the
listing and critical habitat designation, "the President's 2004 Budget provides $129 million
for the FWS endangered species program. The budget increases the ESA listing program by
35 percent to address a litigation-driven workload." BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 558, available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/budget/fy2004/interior.html (last visited Mar 4, 2004). That 35 percent increase
provides a total of only $12,286,000 for dealing with section 4 obligations, including listing,
de-listing, designating critical habitat, and reviewing public petitions. Id. The resolution
requires that FWS use roughly 75 percent of the $12 million to designate critical habitat for
already-listed species. Id.
By way of comparison, this is roughly the same amount appropriated to the U.S.
Botanic Garden. See id. at 24. The U.S. Botanic Garden puts on such important educational
events as "The History of Tea," at http://www.usbg.gov/education/events/The-Historyof-Tea.cfm (last visited Mar. 4, 2004), and "A Passion for Basil," at http://www.usbg.gov/
education/events/A-Passion-for-Basil.cfm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003). This minimal funding
makes it difficult for FWS to meet its statutory obligations.
282. Julie Cart, The State, Species Protection Act "Broken," available at http://www.la
times.com news/science/environment/ la-me-speciesl4novl4,1,1435236.story?coll=la-new
s-environment (last visited Mar. 4, 2004) ("Assistant Secretary of Interior Craig Manson
criticized the critical-habitat provision of the law.. .We didn't anticipate the potential
conflicts. We have to recognize that, A, we can't protect everything, and, B, we have to
carefully examine whether we should try to protect everything, and at what cost?").
283. See JOHN H. CHAFEE, AMENDMENTS TO THE CRITICAL HABITAT REQUIREMENTS OF
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, S.REP. No. 106-126 (1999).

284.

Id.
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of recovery plans." 285 The priority ranking system would have allowed
the agency to set its own agenda, stopping environmental groups from
forcing FWS to act.
Senator Chafee's bill would have solved many of the problems
FWS faces in administering the ESA. Listing is a relatively inexpensive
process but critical habitat designation requires significant amounts of
money and manpower. 286 The FWS prefers to avoid designating critical
habitat if it can because it is drawn from the same budget line-item as
listing,287 which gets FWS more bang for its regulatory buck.28 8 Because
designation is mandatory, the failure to designate is ripe ground for the
environmental citizen-suits 289 that will continue to consume much of
FWS's resources. Senator Chafee's solution would have eliminated the
problem by moving critical habitat designation to the recovery stage,
thereby providing a more efficient way to protect species given the
agency's limited resources. The bill was favorably reported to the Senate
but progressed no further. 290 The only reasonable explanation is that the
political price for reforming the Act was simply too high, even though it
was a sensible change.
At least 12 congressional bills aimed at reforming the ESA were
introduced in 2003, but none of them has made it to the president's
desk.291 One of these, the Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2001,
would have called for "survival" habitat to be designated at the time of
292
listing and critical habitat to be determined at the recovery plan stage.
Though it garnered 80 co-sponsors in the House of Representatives,

285. Id.
286. See Amy Armstrong, Critical Habitat Designations Under the Endangered Species Act:
Giving Meaning to the Requirements for Habitat Protection, 10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 53, n.123 (2002).
See also Notice of Intent, supra note 190, at 31,872.
[t
287. See Notice of Intent, supra note 190, at 31,873 (noting that " ihe consequence of the
critical habitat litigation activity is that we are utilizing much of our very limited listing
program resources in litigation support defending active lawsuits and Notices of Intent
(NOIs) to sue relative to critical habitat, and complying with the growing number of
adverse court orders").
288. Id.
289. The ESA permits "any person" to bring a suit to force FWS to perform a
nondiscretionary duty. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000).
290. See 145 CONG. REC. S9525 (daily ed. July 28, 1999) (Senator Chafee reporting on the
Bill to the Full Senate).
291. See NESARC: National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition- Legislative
Information-Current Bills, at http://www.nesarc.org/leginfo.htm (last visited Mar. 12,
2004).
292. See ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY ACT OF 2001, H.R. 4579, 107th Cong. (2d Sess.,
2001).
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including current minority leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), the bill once
293
again died in committee.
Sadly, these examples highlight the tough political obstacles
facing even sensible alterations to the Act and indicate that legislative
solutions are unlikely. Most of the action, then, will continue to take
place in court, with species in need of protection losing in the long run.
As long as environmental groups continue to force designations on an
impossible (though legislatively required) timeline, aggrieved parties
will continue to bring suit to overturn those hastily done designations.
The FWS is likely to remain in the unfortunate position of either
violating a court order by failing to designate on time or violating the
statutory requirements by designating illegally.294 Faced with the specter
of contempt sanctions, it is likely that FWS will continue to perform
deficient designations and live to face further lawsuits another day.
CONCLUSION
In Arizona Cattle Growers, New Mexico Cattle Growers, and Sierra
Club, the Ninth, Tenth, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have
demonstrated a trend toward limiting agency discretion and enforcing
statutory mandates. After these opinions, FWS must designate critical
habitat within the statutory timeline, must do so according to statutory
procedures, and may only do so after the proper economic analysis. FWS
must not issue ITSs unless it can prove that there is a reasonable
certainty that individual members of an endangered species are likely to
be taken.
More importantly, these three cases demonstrate a developing
trend toward limited administrative authority and less administrative
discretion, confirmed by such recent cases as Homebuilders Association of
Northern California. With environmental and industry lawsuits against
FWS showing no signs of slowing, the trend limiting agency discretion
will continue. Several areas are ripe for challenge including the over293. This bill has been introduced a number of times and passed the House in the
second session of the 106th Congress but did not get out of the Senate. In the 107th
Congress, the bill was referred to the House Committee on Resources and the House
Committee on Ways and Means but was never referred back to the whole House. See 148
CONG. REC. H1618, 1619 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002). Its counterpart in the Senate, S.911, met a
similar fate. See 147 CONG REC. S5118 (daily ed. May 17, 2001). Fortunately, the Senate
found time during that session to pass crucial measures like S. Res. 15, congratulating the
Baltimore Ravens for winning Super Bowl XXXV. See 147 CONG. REC. S833-34 (daily ed.
Jan. 30, 2001).
294. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 163 F. Supp. 2d 16 1297, 1300
(D.N.M. 2001) ("Without sufficient funding or a change in the mandatory tasks required by
Congress, the [FWS] cannot fulfill the myriad of mandatory listing duties.").
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designation of critical habitat, especially regarding "supporting lands."
Since it is almost impossible for the FWS to comply with the terms of the
ESA, it will continue to lose lawsuits and environmentalists will keep
setting the agenda at FWS. While a legislative solution would
significantly ease the administration of the Act, ESA reform is politically
difficult if not impossible. Thus, gridlock, inefficiency, and court battles
are likely to continue to drain the resources meant for species protection.
For now, we are more likely to see further ineffective and inefficient
action by FWS, more headaches for landowners, and less protection for
truly endangered species.

